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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES: A LAW AND
ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
Roee Sarel*
Can anyone really own virtual tokens such as Bitcoin and Ether?
And if so, how should the law protect the rights of the owner? Legal
rulings in federal courts have yielded inconsistent policies
regarding the applicable remedy when rights in cryptocurrencies
are infringed. Some adopt a property rule, granting injunctions and
enforcement of property rights against third parties, whereas others
restrict the remedy to damages. However, all rulings share one
problematic feature: a lack of distinction between types of
crypotokens, resulting in an implicit, one-size-fits-all policy. The
economic analysis of law suggests that the choice between a
property rule and a liability rule should depend on transaction
costs, but such costs typically differ across cryptotokens because
cryptotokens are diverse and customizable. Thus, this Article
proposes to exploit the common taxonomy of cryptotokens, which
distinguishes between security, utility, and currency tokens, as a
proxy for transaction costs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of decentralized ledger technology (and, in
particular, “blockchain”)1 has led to the introduction of a new
category of digital assets: the cryptocurrencies, or more broadly
“cryptotokens.” These include, for example, Bitcoin,2 Ether,3 and
Facebook’s expected new token, the Libra.4 Cryptotokens take many
shapes and forms: some are used as a currency;5 some provide a

1

The terms “blockchain” and “decentralized ledger technology” (“DLT”) are
sometimes used as synonyms, but blockchain is only a subset of the broader
category of DLT. See generally Sally M. Gainsbury & Alex Blaszczynski, How
Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Technology Could Revolutionize Online
Gambling, 21 GAMING L. REV. 482, 482–83 (2017) (explaining that “[b]lockchain
is an open source distributed ledger”).
2
SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM
1 (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AUY-TMEW].
3
What is Ethereum?, ETHEREUM.ORG (Dec. 18, 2020), https://ethereum.org/en/whatis-ethereum [https://perma.cc/ZM3V-Z4PR].
4
DIEM, LIBRA ASS’N MEMBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LIBRA WHITE PAPER
V2.0 2 (Apr. 2020), https://www.diem.com/en-us/white-paper [https://perma.cc/Q3YK7XUX].
5
For example, Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that is now commonly accepted as
means of payments for goods or services. Examples include purchases in the
shopping area of some airports, or payments in real estate transactions. See
Merrick Wang, Bitcoin and its Impact on the Economy 5 (Oct. 3, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.01337 [https://perma.cc/N4
WW-UPNC]. Bitcoin can even direct money withdrawals via ATMs. See, e.g.,
Mitchell Hyman, Bitcoin ATM: A Criminal’s Laundromat for Cleaning Money,
27. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 296, 304 (2015).
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more specific utility (e.g., access to a product);6 and some resemble
financial instruments.7
As the cryptocurrency market is both nascent and ever-evolving,
regulators have struggled to catch up.8 Hence, existing regulation
does not provide clear guidelines as to how courts should treat
disputes involving entitlements in cryptotokens. As with any
entitlement, protection of rights in cryptotokens can be implemented
using one of two options: liability rules or property rules.9
Under a liability rule, whoever infringes upon the rights of a
token holder is liable for damages and must compensate that holder
for any harm caused.10 Respectively, under a property rule, the
remedy for infringement is not compensation, but rather a court
order that enjoins the defendant to abstain from infringing, for

6

A commonly used example for utility tokens is the cryptocurrency Filecoin,
which provides its owner with access to a decentralized cloud storage platform.
See PROTOCOL LABS, FILECOIN: A DECENTRALIZED STORAGE NETWORK 1
(2017), https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7CJ-H65G].
7
For example, the token BCAP—launched by in 2017—provides its holder
with a non-voting economic interest in the limited partnership “Blockchain
Capital,” which operates as a venture capital fund in the crypto market. Lin Lin
& Dominika Nestarcova, Venture Capital in the Rise of Crypto Economy:
Problems and Prospects, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 533, 550 n.68 (2019).
8
See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies, and the
Struggle of Law and Regulation to Keep Peace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447, 450
(2018) (addressing the “constant struggle of law and regulation to keep pace with
rapid technological developments”).
9
A third option is inalienability rules, which reflect non-enforcement. The
operative result of such rules is that the defendant wins the dispute, but they are
traditionally perceived not as property rules in favor of the defendant, but rather
as ruling out the entitlement of the plaintiff. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas A.
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1972).
10
A liability rule permits a party to infringe on another party’s rights, subject
to monetary compensation. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Ent. v. Tenenbaum, 721
F. Supp. 2d 85, 113 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part,
660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The quintessential example of a liability rule is a
rule that permits a factory to pollute only if it compensates surrounding
homeowners by paying them an amount of damages determined by a court.”).
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example, through an injunction.11 The key distinction between these
two types of rules is whether one’s right to a token can be
involuntarily infringed or transferred: a property rule prevents
involuntary transfers (as injunctions restore the right to its original
owner), whereas liability rules facilitate transfers conditional on
compensation.
Furthermore, the distinction is also closely related to the legal
concepts of rights in personam, which are attached to a specific
person, and rights in rem, which are attached to an object and are
enforceable against anyone.12 Liability rules are generally limited to
in personam claims, so that a victim who suffers harm can only
claim compensation against someone who directly interfered with
his right.13 Conversely, property rules typically suggest an in rem

11

A property rule prohibits infringements in the absence of a voluntary
transaction. Id. (“We generally require individuals who wish to reproduce or
distribute a copyrighted work to purchase a license from the copyright owner in a
voluntary transaction. In this sense, copyrights are protected by what academics
in the field of law and economics call a ‘property rule.’ . . . Property rules are
distinguished from liability rules, which permit one party to deprive another party
of something to which the law says he is entitled by paying an objectively
determined value for it.”).
12
The distinction between in personam (“rights to things”) and in rem (“rights
to objects”) has long been a subject of debate among legal scholars. The debate
dates to Blackstone’s definition of a property right, which highlights the in rem
right to exclude others. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to
Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 593, 596 (2008); Thomas W Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What
Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360–61 (2001).
While some argue that all property rights are in rem, others note that all
duty-violations claims (also those concerning an infringement of a property right)
are made against a specific person and are therefore in personam. See, e.g., Pavlos
Eleftheriadis, The Analysis of Property Rights, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 41
(1996); see also Jeremiah Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability Suggested Changes
in Classification, 30 HARV. L. REV. 241, 251 (1916) (arguing that tort claims
could be either for violation of in rem rights or in personam rights). For a general
discussion of rights in rem, see George B. Fraser Jr, Actions in Rem, 34 CORNELL
L.Q. 29, 29–30 (1948).
13
Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1794
(2004).
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property right, thereby allowing victims to also pursue claims
related to the object of property against third parties.14
As cryptocurrencies are virtual assets that are managed in a
decentralized way—so that no central authority is responsible for
registering who owns which crypotoken—treating them as property
is not free of conceptual difficulties.15 Nevertheless, legal policies
around the world all seem to acknowledge that cryptocurrencies are
eligible to be considered as property, so that a property rule could
be implemented to protect entitlements in cryptocurrencies if one
would wish to do so. Notably, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
determined that cryptocurrencies are a “general intangible” that
should be taxed as property.16 Court cases in Canada,17 Singapore,18
the United Kingdom,19 and New Zealand20 also demonstrate a
general willingness to recognize cryptocurrencies as property.
However, courts drastically diverge on the type of remedy that
is available for individuals whose rights in a cryptocurrency are
infringed. In U.S. federal courts, some judicial decisions apply a

14

Id. at 1724.
For further details on the literature’s discussion surrounding the definition of
cryptotokens as property, see infra Part III.B.
16
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2 (May 2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-1421.pdf [https://perma.cc/C28E-62YU]; I.R.S, Frequently Asked Questions on
Virtual Currency Transactions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://
www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/frequently-asked-questions-onvirtual-currency-transactions [https://perma.cc/F9G3-M36] (last visited Feb. 11,
2021). See also Lorena Yashira Gely-Rojas, Cryptocurrencies and the Uniform
Commercial Code: The Curious Case of Bitcoin, 8 UPR BUS. L.J. 129, 134 (2016)
(explaining that the I.R.S. views cryptocurrency as “a digital representation of
value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of
value”).
17
Shair.Com Glob. Digit. Servs. Ltd. v. Arnold, [2018] CanLII 1512 (Can.
B.C.S.C.); Copytrack Pte Ltd. v. Wall, [2018] BCSC 1709 (Can.).
18
B2C2 Ltd. v. Quoine PTC Ltd., [2019] SGHC (I) 03 [142] (2019) (Sing.).
19
AA v. Persons Unknown & Ors, Re Bitcoin, EWHC 3556 (Comm) (2019)
(U.K.).
20
See Paul T. Babie et al., Cryptocurrencies as Property: Ruscoe and Moore v
Cryptopia Limited (In Liquidation) [2020] NZHC 728 at 10 (Univ. of Adelaide
Research Paper No. 2020-33, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578264
[https://perma.cc/2RG9-SK28].
15
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property rule21 whereas others apply a liability rule,22 mostly without
any normative deliberation on why a specific rule was chosen.23
Although there is a clear need to establish a consistent policy with
respect to which legal remedy applies, these decisions largely
neglect economic implications, such as which rule sets better
incentives. In particular, courts do not seem to make any explicit
distinctions between different types of tokens, resulting in a
one-size-fits-all (either property or liability, depending on the case)
rule for every token.24
Determining whether such a unified rule makes sense requires a
framework for evaluating its effects. Luckily, such a framework is
readily available in the economic analysis of law (“law and
economics”). The economic analysis offers a criterion for
determining which type of rule (property or liability) should
generally be applied to protect an entitlement: policymakers should
adopt the rule that is most efficient, meaning the rule that maximizes
social welfare.25 Such a rule should ensure that resources end up in
21
Sony BMG Music Ent. v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 113 (D. Mass.
2010).
22
Id.
23
See infra Part III.AA (discussing the foreign cases mentioned in the text).
24
Note that as most cases revolve around one specific set of tokens, the
judgment simply does not raise the question of whether a token’s type matters
(thus making no distinction). In cases that do involve multiple tokens, the remedy
usually pools together all tokens. For instance, in Bureau of Consumer Fin.
Protect. v. Consumer Advoc. Ctr. Inc., No. 8: 19-CV-01998 2020 WL 7774930
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2020), a receiver was appointed for Bitcoin, Ethereum, and
Bitcoin Cash, without any discussion on whether these differ in any relevant way.
25
In economic terms, maximizing “social welfare” means choosing the option
that maximizes the sum of utilities of individuals in society. Often, this choice is
analyzed in a market setting where profits of firms (“supplier surplus”) and
benefits to consumers (“consumer surplus”) are added up to a “total surplus”
representing social welfare. Alternatively, economists often instead use the term
“efficiency,” where the most efficient solution is the one where social welfare is
maximized. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
12–14 (6th ed. 2016). Note that this article generally follows the traditional
analysis of law and economics, which adopts the assumptions of neoclassical
economics. Id. This analysis entails, for instance, the assumption that the
maximization of social welfare is best achieved by maximizing so-called
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and neglecting distributional considerations. Id. at 42.
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the hands of the person who values them most.26 The typical way in
which goods change hands is through free trade between willing
sellers and buyers, but agreements can only be formed when parties
are able to effectively negotiate, which is hindered when there are
so-called “transaction costs” (hereinafter “TC”). These costs can
arise in different stages of the trade and include initial costs incurred
when searching for a trading partner; costs of bargaining with a
potential trading partner, once a partner is found; and costs incurred
to ensure that all parties comply with the terms of the agreement.27
In particular, TC play a key role in one of the fundamental
theorems in law and economics—the “Coase Theorem.”28
Concisely, the Coase Theorem suggests that when TC are
sufficiently low, parties will negotiate and voluntarily prefer an
efficient allocation to an inefficient one.29 The rationale for this
suggestion is that parties would prefer giving the good to the party
who values it most (irrespective of who owned it initially) as that
party will have the highest willingness to pay for the good—and the
Alternative assumptions, such as the ones offered by behavioral law and
economics, are not considered to focus on the main argument of interest.
26
See, e.g., Edwin C. Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5
PHILOS. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4 (1975).
27
See also infra Part III.B (discussing the exact definitions of TC).
28
The foundations of the Coase theorem are usually attributed to two papers.
See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON 1
(1960) (discussing transaction costs with respect to actions which have negative
effects on others); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,
388 (1937) (analyzing why firms operate as one entity instead of outsourcing tasks
to separate organizations and explaining that a corporation structure saves on
transaction costs). The name “Coase Theorem” was coined later by George
Stigler. See Steven Medema, A Case of Mistaken Identity: George Stigler, ‘The
Problem of Social Cost,’ and the Coase Theorem, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 11, 12
(2011).
29
The economic logic is that if the parties do not incur high transaction costs,
then the party who assigns a higher value to a good would offer to pay the other
party (who values the good less) enough money, so that a transaction would take
place, leading to a more efficient allocation (where the party valuing the good
more ends up owning it). For this logic to work, transaction costs must be
sufficiently low. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 85 (defining this
aspect of the Coase Theorem as “[w]hen transaction costs are zero, an efficient
use of resources results from private bargaining, regardless of the legal
assignment of property rights”).
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extra surplus that this exchange creates can be split between the
parties. Thus, allocative efficiency will not depend on the
assignment of the initial property rights if TC are sufficiently low,
so that the parties will in fact trade.30 The seminal paper by Calabresi
and Melamed extended this insight and proposed to adopt property
rules whenever TC are low—as then parties will achieve efficiency
by trading—and liability rules otherwise.31
Applying the logic of law and economics to the question of how
to protect entitlements in cryptocurrencies reveals that a
one-size-fits-all rule that applies for all tokens is unlikely to be
efficient, as TC are likely to differ greatly from token to token.
Namely, tokens are not homogenous,32 and their values starkly
depend on factors such as the details of the computer code that
generated the token, the purposes for which the token can be used,
the liquidity of the token, and so on.33 Thus, it seems obvious that a
one-size-fits-all rule makes little sense.
At the same time, establishing tailor-made rules for each token
seems both tedious and costly, so some middle ground must be
found. In the following pages, this Article seeks to exploit a
common taxonomy of tokens, which divides tokens into three

30

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 81–88.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1118.
32
For evidence that cryptocurrencies are, in fact, heterogeneous, see Frida
Gustafsson & Elias Bengtsson, Are Cryptocurrencies Homogenous? (Dec. 2, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3496527 [https://perma.cc/XEH6MVC3].
33
The computer code behind a token determines what the token can and cannot
do and hence determines what the exact value of holding the token is. For instance,
if the code entails a mistake, it might reduce the value of the token. Similarly, the
utility of using the token depends on what one can do with it, which is also
determined by the code. Furthermore, as with any financial instrument, liquidity
can play a role as well: if one buys a token but cannot sell it easily (due to low
liquidity), this predicament entails a disadvantage. Note, however, that the
empirical evidence regarding the effect of illiquidity is mixed. See Steven E.
Kozlowski et al., Cryptocurrency Return Reversals, APPLIED ECON. LETT.
(forthcoming) (finding evidence consistent with negative “reversal” effect for
illiquid cryptocurrencies); Wang Chun Wei, Liquidity and Market Efficiency in
Cryptocurrencies, 168 ECON. LETT. 21 (2018) (finding no evidence of illiquidity
premiums).
31
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categories: utility, currency, and security.34 These categories are
helpful in capturing some aspects of TC and can thus serve as a
benchmark for developing appropriate rules.
This Article suggests that, from a pure TC perspective, security
tokens are best protected by liability rules, whereas currency tokens
are better protected through property rules. However, this Article’s
analysis also suggests that other efficiency considerations, such as
preventing imperfect compensation when tokens are non-fungible,
may support a different conclusion. Furthermore, given that the
features of such tokens will always strongly depend on their
connection to a specific underlying product or service, the choice of
rule for utility tokens is generally still better off left to a case-by-case
approach.
The rest of this Article is organized as follows: Part II provides
an overview of cryptocurrencies and the debate surrounding their
taxonomy. Part III reviews the existing case law and its
inconsistencies, as well as the existing literature related to property
rights in cryptocurrencies. Part IV then analyzes how insights from
law and economics can help determine which rule should be adopted
to best protect entitlements in cryptocurrencies. Part V concludes.
II. CRYPTOTOKENS: OVERVIEW AND TAXONOMY
A. Historical overview
In 2008, an author using the alias “Satoshi Nakamoto,” posted a
mysterious white paper online titled “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer
Electronic Cash System.”35 This white paper revealed a new and
exciting technology: a digital token that can be freely transferred
between owners without the need to rely on a central entity to
register transactions.36 Instead, the Bitcoin token transactions are
recorded using a decentralized ledger technology, which combines
advanced encryption, cryptography, and a chain of connected
34

See infra Part II.B (discussing token taxonomy).
See NAKAMOTO, supra note 2, at 8.
36
See, e.g., Dennis Chu, Broker-Dealers for Virtual Currency: Regulating
Cryptocurrency Wallets and Exchanges, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2323, 2326 (2018)
(“Cryptocurrencies are digital assets recorded on decentralized, public ledgers.”).
35
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“blocks” (yielding the name “blockchain”) that ensures the data is
immutable.37 Bitcoin is algorithmically designed to be a scarce
resource that is released over time at a marginally decreasing speed,
where new tokens enter the market only through the process of
“mining.”38 As there is no central entity keeping track of the
ownership in Bitcoin, the system offers Bitcoin holders technical
control: each Bitcoin is protected by a pair of keys (each consisting
of a unique serial number)—a private key and a public key.39 The
public key serves as the Bitcoin’s address (somewhat similar to a
bank account number), and the private key serves as the login details
(somewhat similar to a user name and password) that grants access
to the token and allows the transfer of the token to others.40
Although blockchain was developed to facilitate Bitcoin
specifically, the general technological advantages spiked the interest
of many.41 Then, as the demand for Bitcoin began to soar (reaching
37

For the discussion in this Article, it is not necessary to delve too deeply into
how blockchain technology exactly works. For overviews of the technology,
see generally DYLAN YAGA ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S.
DEP’T OF COM., BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW (Oct. 2018),
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1906/1906.11078.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM2WVQQ8] (explaining the history, components, limitations, and misconceptions of
blockchain technology); Lin William Cong & Zhiguo He, Blockchain Disruption
and Smart Contracts, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1754 (2019) (discussing blockchain
technology’s categorization as a “decentralized consensus”). For an overview of
Bitcoin in particular, see generally Christian Rueckert, Cryptocurrencies and
Fundamental Rights, 5 J. CYBERSECURITY 1 (2019) (explaining how current
regulatory frameworks interact with Bitcoin).
38
Mining is the process in which users operate “nodes” by providing their
computing power and disk-storage space for solving puzzles as part of the “Proofof-work” consensus algorithm. For further details, see, for example, Vikrant
Gandotra et al., Cryptocurrency Mining, in CRYPTOFINANCE AND MECHANISMS
OF EXCHANGE 51 (Stéphane Goutte et al. eds., 2019).
39
NAKAMOTO, supra note 2, at 2.
40
For a review of the technology, see, for example, David Fox,
Cryptocurrencies in the Common Law of Property (Aug. 16, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3232501 [https://perma.cc/PZU8-SR7D];
Michael Ng, Choice of Law for Property Issues Regarding Bitcoin Under English
Law, 15 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 315, 315–16 (2019).
41
See, e.g., Jesse Yli-Huumo et al., Where is Current Research on Blockchain
Technology?—A Systematic Review, 11 PLOS ONE, at 9 (2016) (finding empirical
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a price of approximately $20,000 per token in 2017, and passing
$60,000 in March 2021),42 market players started creating their own
cryptotokens. The creation of cryptotokens by market participants
was made possible by the introduction of the Ethereum blockchain,43
which enabled enterprises to create customized tokens and sell them
publicly in an “initial coin offering” (“ICO”).44 ICOs were
particularly attractive for entrepreneurs for different reasons,
including the fact that issuing tokens enabled them to (1) raise funds
without diluting the founder’s rights45 and at a relatively low cost;46
(2) get access to investors that are typically inaccessible in traditional

evidence of increasing scientific publications relating to blockchain). See also
Dmitry Efanov & Pavel Roschin, The All-pervasiveness of the Blockchain
Technology, 123 PROCEDIA COMP. SCI. 116, 116 (2018) (describing blockchain
technology as “the most significant invention after the internet”); Ye Guo & Chen
Liang, Blockchain Application and Outlook in the Banking Industry, 2 FIN.
INNOVATION 24, 32 (2016) (referring to a blockchain product as currently being
“the most promising model in the banking industry”); Andreas Kamilaris et al.,
The Rise of Blockchain Technology in Agriculture and Food Supply Chains, 91
TRENDS IN FOOD SCI. & TECH. 640, 641 (2019) (stating that “it has increasingly
been realized that blockchain can be used for much more than cryptocurrency and
financial transactions, so that several new applications are being explored”).
42
Bitcoin,
COINDESK
(last
visited
Dec.
29,
2020),
https://www.coindesk.com/price/bitcoin [https://perma.cc/E7RV-KPLU]; Emma
Newburger, Bitcoin surpasses $60,000 in Record High as Rally Accelerates, CNBC
(Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/13/bitcoin-surpasses-60000-inrecord-high-as-rally-accelerates-.html [https://perma.cc/LJ5Q-D9KP].
43
See generally GAVIN WOOD ET AL., ETHEREUM: A SECURE DECENTRALISED
GENERALISED TRANSACTION LEDGER (2014) (providing an overview of
Ethereum’s blockchain technology).
44
See Jake Frankenfield, What Is an Initial Coin Offering (ICO)?,
INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/initialcoin-offering-ico.asp [https://perma.cc/277Z-SPMU] (explaining that “[an] initial
coin offering (ICO) is the cryptocurrency industry’s equivalent to an initial public
offering (IPO)”).
45
Ralf Wandmacher, Tokenomics, in CRYPTOFINANCE AND MECHANISMS OF
EXCHANGE 113, 113–23 (Stéphane Goutte et al. eds., 2019).
46
Usman W. Chohan, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs): Risks, Regulation, and
Accountability, in CRYPTOFINANCE AND MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE 165, 165–
77 (Stéphane Goutte et al. eds., 2019).

400

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 3

funding;47 and (3) avoid complex regulatory requirements that apply to
traditional fundraising methods such as initial public offerings.48
Cryptotokens soon proliferated and billions of dollars were raised
from 2016 to 2019.49 Over this period of time, so-called “crypto
exchanges” began popping up. These exchanges operate similarly to
a stock exchange and provide the market with liquidity by allowing
sellers and buyers to trade between different tokens that are listed
on the exchange.50 Furthermore, exchanges often offer a “wallet”
service, in which clients can open an online account at the exchange
and store their private keys.51
At the same time, cryptotokens were bombarded with criticism.
Tokens were accused of facilitating tax evasion,52 scams,53 Ponzi

47

Chen Liu & Haoquan Wang, Crypto Tokens and Token Offerings: An
Introduction, in CRYPTOFINANCE AND MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE 125, 125–44
(Stéphane Goutte et al. eds., 2019).
48
See generally Hadar Y. Jabotinsky, The Regulation of CryptocurrenciesBetween a Currency and a Financial Product, 31 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L. J. 118, 123 (2020) (noting that “crowdfunding was not possible due to
the heavy transaction costs associated with raising small amounts of money from
many different investors”).
49
Estimates of the exact amounts raised in ICOs vary, but most sources claim
that tens of billions of USD were raised between 2017 and 2019. See, e.g., Shadi
Samieifar & Dirk G. Baur, Read Me if You Can! An Analysis of ICO White Papers,
38 FIN. RES. LETTERS (Jan. 2021) (stating that more than 30 billion dollars were
raised in ICOs between 2016 and 2019).
50
MARIA DEMERTZIS & GUNTRAM B. WOLFF, THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND
RISKS OF CRYPTO ASSETS: IS A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK NEEDED? 8 (2018),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/208022/1/1030937354.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C24H-G73U].
51
This sort of wallet is usually referred to as a “hot wallet.” See Patrick
McCorry et al., Why Preventing a Cryptocurrency Exchange Heist isn’t Good
Enough, in 11286 SECURITY PROTOCOLS XXVI 225 (Vashek Matyáš et al. eds,
2018) (explaining that a cold wallet is an “offline wallet” where cryptocurrencies
are stored). Conversely, a wallet that stores the private keys offline is called a
“cold wallet.” See id.
52
Thomas Slattery, Taking a Bit out of Crime: Bitcoin and Cross-Border Tax
Evasion, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 829, 844 (2014).
53
Maria Vasek & Tyler Moore, There’s No Free Lunch, Even Ssing Bitcoin:
Tracking the Popularity and Profits of Virtual Currency Scams, in FINANCIAL
CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY 44, 44 (Rainer Böhme & Tatsuaki Okamoto
eds., 2015).
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schemes,54 money laundering,55 and other forms of criminal
activity.56 Then, from 2018 to 2019, governments became
increasingly concerned with the crypto market.57 Some countries
prohibited ICOs completely (e.g., China and Korea),58 while others
gradually adopted regulatory rules and guidelines that impose strict
requirements on ICOs.59 Eventually, the planned interventions,
alongside other effects, yielded a highly bearish60 market in 2019, so
that ICOs ceased almost completely.61 At the same time, two
alternatives were born. First, many entrepreneurs turned to Security
Token Offerings (“STOs”) in which a token is issued, like any other
security, with full regulatory compliance (i.e., with a prospectus,

54
See generally Maria Vasek & Tyler Moore, Analyzing the Bitcoin Ponzi
Scheme Ecosystem, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY 101, 104–
106 (Aviv Zohar et al. eds., 2018) (discussing various Bitcoin-based Ponzi
schemes).
55
Rolf van Wegberg et al., Bitcoin Money Laundering: Mixed Results? An
Explorative Study on Money Laundering of Cybercrime Proceeds Using Bitcoin,
25 J. FIN. CRIME 17, 20 (2018).
56
Sean Foley et al., Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity is
Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 179, 180 (2019).
57
For instance, in late 2017, The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) published a primer on virtual currencies highlighting
various risks. See CTFC, A CFTC PRIMER ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (Oct. 17, 2017),
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/file/labcftc_primercurrencies100417
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3NY-SBCQ]. For overviews of regulations around the
world as of 2018, see generally GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER,
REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND THE WORLD (June 2018),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/cryptocurrency-world-survey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F52U-CGU6] (discussing regulatory frameworks applied to
cryptocurrencies internationally).
58
Saman Adhami et al., Why do Businesses Go Crypto? An Empirical Analysis
of Initial Coin Offerings, 100 J. ECON. BUS. 1, 10 (2018).
59
Chohan, supra note 46, at 165–77.
60
In finance, a market in which prices are on the rise is sometimes called a “bull
market” or “bullish,” whereas a market in which prices go down is called a “bear
market” or “bearish.”
61
See Naeem Aslam, Why A Crypto Bear Market Would Only Bring The Best ICOs,
FORBES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/naeemaslam/2018/03/29/whycrypto-bear-market-would-only-bring-the-best-icos/?sh=a78e71131d2a
[https://perma.cc/6SAU-TLBW] (discussing the effect 2018’s bear market had on
the frequency and quality of ICOs).
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etc.).62 Second, some entrepreneurs turned to Initial Exchange
Offerings (“IEOs”)63 in which the initial offering is performed
through the crypto exchanges, which sell the tokens to their existing
client base. As of 2020, IEOs are still operable, but new regulations
are constantly adopted which have limited their scope. For instance,
the European Union (“EU”) adopted the “Fifth Anti Money
Laundering Directive” (2015/849) which requires member states to
ensure that issuers of virtual tokens will conduct a thorough
Know-Your-Client (“KYC”) process and verify the identity of all
buyers, which naturally imposes a burden on exchanges.64
The market for cryptocurrencies experienced turmoil in early
2020, following the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic—a global
event causing various economic shocks—leading to further interest
in the crypto market.65 In parallel, new regulation proposals were
released in the EU in the form of a “digital finance package,”66
entailing suggestions aimed to unify the regulation of trade in
cryptocurrencies and of blockchain infrastructure.67 Concurrently,
the U.S. Conference of State Bank Supervisors (“CSBS”)
announced the launch of a program that similarly strives to achieve
62
Othalia Doe-Bruce, Blockchain and Alternative Sources of Financing, in
CRYPTOFINANCE AND MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE 91, 101 (Stéphane Goutte et
al. eds., 2019).
63
Id. at 108. See also Dmitri Boreiko et al., Blockchain Startups and Prospectus
Regulation, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 665, 672 (2019) (explaining that startups
use ICOs “to finance project development by issuing coins or tokens in exchange
for fiat money or Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies”).
64
Another example is a new law adopted in South Korea, which requires
exchanges to identify clients by name. See David Lee, South Korea Passes Law
to Introduce Permit System for Crypto Exchanges, COINTELEGRAPH (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/south-korea-passes-law-to-introduce-permit-systemfor-crypto-exchanges.https://cointelegraph.com/news/south-korea-passes-law-tointroduce-permit-system-for-crypto-exchanges [https://perma.cc/3MF7-BLN8].
65
See generally Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & Roee Sarel, How Crisis Affects Crypto:
Coronavirus as a Test Case (Mar. 23, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3557929 [https://perma.cc/YBJ2-FSZB] (producing
empirical evidence on how the market for cryptocurrencies responded to the
Covid-19 crisis).
66
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Markets in Crypto-assets, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, at 1, COM
(2020) 593 final (Sept. 24, 2020).
67
Id.

APR 2021]

Property Rights in Cryptocurrencies

403

unified regulation of firms offering monetary services—including
cryptocurrencies—across the states.68
B. Taxonomy of tokens
While regulators were working on new frameworks, a consensus
began to form around the taxonomy of tokens, leading to the
common use of three categories: (1) utility tokens, (2) security
tokens, and (3) currency tokens.69
Utility tokens confer direct utility that is embedded in the
token’s specific characteristics.70 The most common case is one
68
Press Release, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, State Regulators Roll
Out One Company, One Exam for Nationwide Payments Firms (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://www.csbs.org/regulators-announce-one-company-one-exam-forpayments-companies [https://perma.cc/VV5C-3AVS].
69
Stéphane Blemus & Dominique Guegan, Initial Cryptoasset Offerings (ICOs),
Tokenization and Corporate Governance 1 (Mar. 27, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1905/1905.03340.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTP7GUQU]; Wandmacher, supra note 45, at 115. See also Josephine Nelson,
Cryptocommunity Currencies, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 3, 4 (discussing the debate
on how tokens should be classified). In the European Union, currency tokens are
sometimes known as “payment tokens” and security tokens are known as
“investment tokens.” Valeria Ferrari, The Regulation of Crypto-assets in the EU–
investment and Payment Tokens under the Radar, 27 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &
COMP. L. 325, 329 (2020). In a new regulation draft as part of the digital finance
package, the EU explicitly recommends classifying tokens into categories that
include “utility tokens,” “asset-referenced” tokens and “electronic money”
tokens. See Proposal, supra note 66, at § 9 of the Preamble. See Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in CryptoAsset (MiCa), draft (2020) [hereinafter MiCA], https://www.politico.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/CLEAN-COM-Draft-Regulation-Markets-in-CryptoAssets.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4SF-52JD] (explaining that the proposal will
“distinguish between three sub-categories of ‘crypto-assets’ that should be subject
to specific requirements”). In contrast, security tokens are governed under the
“Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II” (“MiFID II”). Article 2(2) of
MiCA excludes financial instruments. For a review of the MiFID II directive, see
generally Danny Busch, MiFID II: Regulating High Frequency Trading, other
Forms of Algorithmic Trading and Direct Electronic Market Access, 10 L. & FIN.
MKTS. 72 (2016) (discussing the CFTC’s steps to regulate in market manipulation
and associated forms of algorithmic trading).
70
Utility tokens can confer direct utility by allowing the holder to use them as
part of a specific digitized system. For example, a utility token that grants access
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where the token grants access to some application, product, or
service.71 For instance, a club might choose to offer a membership
card in the form of a token, so that the token’s holder enjoys a utility
from services offered by the club. As another example, consider
theater tickets: the holder presents the ticket at the entrance and
gains access to the show. If theater tickets are “tokenized” and
digitally sold, the token grants direct utility to its buyer. As a third
example, some children’s playgrounds include devices that can only
be operated with physical tokens. If these were replaced with a
decentralized digital token, the token would grant utility to its
holder.
Security tokens provide their holders with financial rights and
are conceptually like instruments such as debt or equity.72 Such
tokens largely take two forms. First, some tokens are purposefully
issued as a digital representation of a standard instrument, often in
an STO.73 For instance, a company may offer a share-like token that
provides revenue sharing, dividends, or voting rights.74 Second, some
tokens provide financial benefits that implicitly fulfill the existing
definition of a security, even if they are not marketed that way.75
to computational services, such as Filecoin, grants its holder the direct benefit of
using these services. PROTOCOL LABS, supra note 6.
71
Doe-Bruce, supra note 62; Vladislav Burilov, Utility Token Offerings and
Crypto Exchange Listings: How Regulation Can Help? at 10 (Aug. 7, 2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284049
[https://perma.cc/DWG7-N3AY]. See also MiCA, supra note 69, at art. 3(1)(g).
72
Id.
73
Doe-Bruce, supra note 62.
74
For instance, the token DAO grants holders with both a right to vote and a
share of the profits. Jabotinsky, supra note 48, at 145.
75
There are various ways in which a security token (which is not marketed that
way) can provide financial benefits: the holder can decide to hold on to the token,
expecting that the value increases over time due to actions of other people, and
then sell it for profit. See JT Hamrick et al., The Economics of Cryptocurrency
Pump and Dump Schemes 8 (Ctr. Econ. Pol’y Rsch. Discussion Paper No.
DP13404, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3310307 [https://perma.cc/4HJ8G6PD]. This strategy is sometimes referred to as “HODL,” an acronym for “Hold
on for Dear Life.” Id. Another way in which investors can benefit is through
“pump and dump” schemes by manipulating the market price through inflated
demand followed by a quick sale once the price increases. Id. As another example,
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Currency tokens serve as means of payment for purchasing
services or goods.76 These tokens differ from utility tokens, as they
do not provide specific utility or access to a particular service.77
They also differ from security tokens, as they do not grant financial
rights. Instead, these tokens derive their value from the willingness
of others to accept them as a form of payment.78
For some tokens, the classification is easy. For example, tokens
such as Bitcoin (“BTC”),79 Monero (“XMR”), Zcash (“ZEC”), Dash
(“DASH”), Bitcoin Cash (“BCH”), and Litecoin (“LTC”) were
designed explicitly as a substitute for money: they are not attached
to a specific platform and are accepted as a form of payment across
many contexts.80 An even more explicit example are the so-called
“Stable coins”81 such as Tether (“USDT”), Steem Dollars (“SBD”),

early investors can sometimes purchase tokens at a discounted rate using early
agreements, so that a profit can be made by selling after an ICO. See Doe-Bruce,
supra note 62, at 98.
76
Id.
77
Although currency tokens might be used to purchase access to a good or
service (similarly to fiat currencies), they do not—by themselves—grant specific
access. Philipp Hacker & Chris Thomale, Crypto-securities Regulation: ICOs,
Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies Under EU Financial Law, 15 EUR. COMP. &
FIN. L. REV. 645, 676–80 (2018). This distinction can be thought of as the
difference between a concert ticket (granting access to the concert) and the money
paid to purchase the ticket.
78
See generally Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN.ORG (last visited Dec. 19,
2019), https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#how-are-bitcoins-created [https://perma.cc/9VTS3GXC] (explaining that Bitcoin’s value stems from its users’ “trust and
adoption”).
79
Specifically, for Bitcoin, there has nonetheless been some debate considering
empirical evidence, which suggest that Bitcoin “behaves” more like a technology
product than a currency. See Reilly White et al., Is Bitcoin a Currency, a
Technology-Based Product, or Something Else?, 151 TECH. FORECAST SOC.
CHANGE 1, 7 (2020).
80
See HSB Survey Finds One-Third of Small Businesses Accept
Cryptocurrency, BUSINESSWIRE (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20200115005482/en/HSB-Survey-Finds-One-Third-Small-BusinessesAccept [https://perma.cc/H2CC-34B7].
81
See Doe-Bruce, supra note 62, at 102; Usman W. Chohan, Are Stable Coins
Stable? (discussion paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326823 [https://perma.cc/8YJJNXBC].
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and Paxos (“PAX”) that strive to imitate another currency and thus
seem to neatly fit into the category of currency tokens.82
Similarly, tokens that are launched in an STO and explicitly
confer revenue sharing or provide a debt-like instrument, such as
Blockchain Capital (“BCAP”), Spice VC (“SPICE”), and Nexo
(“NEXO”), are easily classifiable as security tokens.83 Along similar
lines, tokens that are exclusively limited to providing access to a
product can usually be classified as utility tokens. For instance,
tokens such as Golem (“GNT”) and Filecoin (“FIL”), which grant
access to additional computing power, are typically classified as
utility tokens.84
However, once one moves away from simple token designs, it
can become extremely difficult to determine the boundaries between
the different categories. Ether (“ETH”), which provides access to
the Ethereum blockchain, is an example.85 As Ether is directly linked
to a specific service and does not provide financial rights, it is
unsurprising that some scholars have classified it as a utility token.86
Others instead classify Ether as a security token,87 and even still,

82

The question of whether Tether constitutes a security has been raised, but not
yet decided, in the case of In the matter of James v. iFINEX INC, NY Slip Op. at
1 (N.Y. 2019).
83
See, e.g., Florie Mazzorana-Kremer, Blockchain-Based Equity and STOs:
Towards a Liquid Market for SME Financing?, 9 THEORETICAL ECON. LETTS. 1534,
1545 (2019) (referring to Nexo as a security token); Liz Whelan, SPiCE VC to List
Security Token on Black Manta Capital Partners, BUSINESSWIRE (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20201215005822/en
[https://perma.cc/KU63-ZMPK] (reporting the launch of the security token SPICE);
Boreiko et al., supra note 63 (referring to BCAP as a de facto investment that is
subject to securities regulation).
84
Blemus & Guegan, supra note 69, at 9; Richard Holden & Anup Malani, The
ICO Paradox: Transactions Costs, Token Velocity, and Token Value 11 (Nat’l
Bureau Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 26265, 2019), http://research.economics.
unsw.edu.au/richardholden/assets/w26265.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SQW-PNYG].
85
ETHEREUM.ORG, supra note 3.
86
Nate Crosser, Initial Coin Offerings as Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain
Utility Tokens Securities?, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 393 (2018) (noting that
Crosser uses the term “cryptocommodity” as a synonym for “utility token”).
87
Jabotinsky, supra note 48, at 150.
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some scholars classify Ether as a currency token,88 because one of
its uses is to pay for so-called “gas charges” that are charged when
using the Ethereum blockchain.89 Such a conclusion may also arise
due to the recent movements in the crypto-world, which has given
rise to so-called Decentralized Finance (“DeFi”) projects. These
projects may require users to deposit Ether as collateral and in return
grant the users another token.90 Depositing Ether brings it closer to
a currency—it is utilized as an acceptable form of payment, rather
than used directly to get access to its originally linked service.
A second, more difficult, example involves the distinction
between utility tokens and security tokens. Consider any token that
would give both access to some service and revenue sharing (e.g., a
token that provides membership to a club, but also a right to residual
earnings at the end of the year). Such a token would have both utility
and security features, making the classification challenging. In other
words, many different hybrid varieties of a token can exist.91
Given the challenge of classifying tokens, a long list of questions
arises: Should “hybrid tokens”92 be treated as utility tokens or
88
See, e.g., Christian Masiak et al., Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs): Market
Cycles and Relationship with Bitcoin and Ether, 55 SMALL BUS. ECON. 1113,
1115 (2019).
89
See Boreiko et al., supra note 63, at 671 (“The biggest protocol platform is
Ethereum, and many proprietary tokens are just dapps of the Ethereum ecosystem
(the ‘Ethereum Virtual Machine’), where Ether is used as a currency (but it is
actually called ‘gas’) to pay for the computing power required to obtain consensus
and to execute transactions.”); Shaanan Cohney et al., Coin-operated Capitalism,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 603 (2019) (“To perform computations on this
decentralized ‘world computer,’ users must pay a per-function fee of ‘ether’—a
‘gas’ charge—which functions as Ethereum’s currency.”).
90
See, e.g., Leon Perlman, Regulation of the Financial Components of the
Crypto-Economy 212, n.335 (SIPAs Entrepreneurship & Pol’y Initiative Working
Paper Series, 2019) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3493342 [https://perma.cc/53L62J7U] (discussing the Dai token). See also Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Lessons from
Case Study of Secured Transactions with Bitcoin, 21 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
181, 193 (2018); Richard Hagerty & Amir Shachmurove, The Lay of a Virtual
Land: Cryptocurrencies as Collateral, 2019 BUS. CREDIT MAG. 10, 10 (May
2019) (providing an example of credit based on tokens as collateral).
91
Bart Custers & Lara J. Overwater, Regulating Initial Coin Offerings and
Cryptocurrencies: A Comparison of Different Approaches in Nine Jurisdictions
Worldwide, 10 EUR. J.L. & TECH 1, 5 (2019).
92
Doe-Bruce, supra note 62, at 103.
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security tokens? Does the answer depend on which feature is
dominant? And should one create sub-categories? For now, these
questions remain unanswered and have already led to some
confusion and several legal disputes. The most well-known example
is perhaps the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
proceedings against the popular messaging application, Telegram.93
In early 2018, Telegram issued their TON and GRAM tokens and
promised to construct a new and faster blockchain infrastructure,
raising a staggering amount of $1.7 billion.94 The SEC argued that
the issued tokens are, in fact, a security, and thus accused Telegram
of breaching U.S. securities law.95 The proceedings ended in a
settlement in which Telegram acknowledged its liability and agreed
to pay back $1.2 billion to the investors.96 Several other proceedings
by the SEC against other issuers have resulted in similar decisions
that treat tokens as securities.97
The difficulty in classifying tokens is not limited to their
features, but also to the divergence in definitions across the globe.
In the United States, instruments are securities if they fulfill the
definitions set in SEC v. WJ Howey Co.98 The Howey test asks
whether: (1) a person has invested money; (2) in a common enterprise;

93

S.E.C. v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (PKC) at *1 (S.D.N.Y 2019);
see also Blemus & Guegan, supra note 69, at 9, n.19 (explaining the SEC’s use
of securities law precedent to pursue initial coin offerings).
94
Ilya Khrennikov. Telegram Raises $1.7 Billion in Coin Offering, May Seek
More, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2018, 4:20 A.M.), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-03-30/telegram-raises-1-7-billion-in-coin-offering-may-seek-more
[https://perma.cc/TU3X-M8XG].
95
S.E.C., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (PKC) at *11.
96
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Telegram to Return $1.2 Billion
to Investors and Pay $18.5 Million Penalty to Settle SEC Charges (June 26, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-146 [https://perma.cc/Q32M-AD7W].
97
For a review of the SEC’s enforcement policy, see generally James J. Park &
Howard H. Park, Regulation by Selective Enforcement: The SEC and Initial Coin
Offerings, 61 WASH. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 110–18 (2020) (discussing the S.E.C.’s
regulatory response to various ICOs).
98
328 U.S. 93 (1946).
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and (3) was led to expect profits (4) solely from the effort of the
promoter or of someone other than themselves.99
For clear-cut cases of security tokens, the Howey test seems
straightforward. For instance, in the case of the “Monkey Capital
Coin,” a decentralized hedge fund issued a token that pooled
investments of individuals and distributed profit.100 This token was
classified as a security without much deliberation.101 In Rensel v.
Centra Tech., Inc.,102 the security status of a token granting access
to a debit card was not even disputed by the parties.103
However, in many other instances, the Howey test easily yields
ambiguous results. An investment of money is made in an ICO but
not in so-called “Airdrops,”104 although both events distribute the
same token. A common enterprise requires that the fortune of
holders be somehow tied to the efforts of other holders or of the
promoter,105 but designating cryptotokens as such may depend on
(1) how others use the tokens, and (2) which uses the token has,
which may change over time. In a recent case, a U.S. federal court
adopted a very broad interpretation of the “common enterprise”
requirement with respect to cryptotokens. In Balestra v. ATBCOIN
99

The last criterion appears in the original decision as specified in the text, but
has subsequently been rephrased in several different ways, sometimes neglecting
“solely” and other times neglecting “the promoter.” See, e.g., Jabotinsky, supra
note 48, at 137; Benjamin Van Adrichem, Howey Should be Distributing New
Cryptocurrencies: Applying the Howey Test to Mining, Airdropping, Forking, and
Initial Coin Offerings, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 388, 399 (2019).
100
Hodges v. Harrison, 372 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
101
Id. at 1349.
102
See generally Rensel v. Centra Tech., Inc., No. 17-24500-Civ (S.D. Fla.,
May 13, 2019) (finding the cryptotokens in question a security, without dispute
of that issue).
103
See generally id. (ruling on a motion to dismiss, stating that “[t]he parties do
not dispute that the CTR Tokens are unregistered securities and that the Defendant
used the facilities of interstate commerce”).
104
Airdrops are distributions of cryptotokens for free, usually for the purpose
gaining attention, followers, and a larger user base. See Van Adrichem, supra note
99. See also Solis v. Latium Network, Inc., No. 18-10255, 2018 WL 6445543 at
*4 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2018) (finding that buyers’ participation in ICOs satisfies the
“investment” definition as it pertains to the Howey test’s analysis of “investment
contracts”).
105
S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004).
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LLC,106 the court held that if money collected in an ICO is intended
for a specific purpose, then all of the buyers’ money pooled together
constitutes a “common enterprise.”107
Expectation of profits seems subjective: some people buy the
token in speculation that its value will increase, while others buy it
for its utility value. Effort of others seems equally vague: does the
mere fact that people exert effort to mine the token fulfill this
requirement? And how should one treat a token that yields profits
only if the holder and others jointly exert effort? Here, federal courts
have also taken a broad interpretation, noting that the term “solely”
should not be construed as a literal limitation, so that courts are free
to consider all the circumstances.108 For instance, in Balestra, the
court held that because the defendants marketed the token as an asset
whose value is expected to increase when the company will launch
its product, the “effort of others” requirement was directly
fulfilled.109
Given the very wide interpretation of the Howey test, some have
cautioned that even currency tokens, such as Bitcoin, might be
classified as securities by courts.110 To make things worse, even if a
token fails the Howey test and is viewed as a security at first, it is
unclear whether the token will continue to constitute a security
post-ICO. For instance, Michael J. O’Connor argues that a token
may constitute a security when issued in an ICO, but ceases to be a
106

380 F. Supp. 3d 340, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
See id. at 354. This case, however, seems to have ended in an eventual
settlement with opaque details. See generally Balestra v. ATBCoin, LLC, No. 17CV-10001 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2020) (order discontinuing action) (noting that it
“has been reported to the Court that this case has been settled”).
108
Balestra, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 355.
109
Compare Solis, 2018 WL 6445543 at *4, with S.E.C., 540 U.S at 394
(explaining that there is “no reason to distinguish between promises of fixed
returns and promises of variable returns” in investment contract analysis).
110
Gely-Rojas, supra note 16, at 33. In one case in Florida, a court classified
Bitcoin as a “payment instrument” (neglecting the Howey test altogether), so that
regulation concerning exchanges of currencies applied to the defendant. See
Florida v. Espinoza, 264 So. 3d 1055, 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). Conversely,
in another case, the court rejected the claim that crypto-currencies are “cash-like”
without explicitly applying the Howey test. See Tucker v. Chase Bank, 399 F.
Supp. 3d 105, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
107
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security when traded on exchanges, as then the promise of future
profit is absent.111 Kristin Johnson proposes to exempt crypto
exchanges from SEC registration, given that trade is not identical to
an initial offering.112 Patricia H. Lee notes that agreements which
promise that early investors will receive tokens in a future ICO
(so-called “SAFT” agreements)113 may transform utility tokens into
securities.114 Dmitri Boreiko et al. argue more strongly that, under
the current European regulation, all tokens should be classified as
securities.115
The SEC published guidelines on how to apply the Howey test,
addressing the difficulties in doing so with thirty-eight separate
considerations.116 M. Todd Henderson and Max Raskin proposed to
111

Michael J. O’Connor, Overreaching its Mandate: Considering the SEC’s
Authority to Regulate Cryptocurrency Exchanges, 11 DREXEL L. REV. 539, 566
(2018).
112
Kristin N. Johnson, Cryptocurrency Secondary Market Trading Platforms
2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 26, 30 (2020)
113
A Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (“SAFT”) provides investors with
the right to purchase tokens at a discount once they are issued or sold under predefined conditions. They are similar to Simple Agreements for Future Equity (or
“SAFE” agreements), which provide a similar right but with respect to equity
instead of tokens. See Sabrina T. Howell et al., Initial Coin Offerings: Financing
Growth with Cryptocurrency Token Sales, REV. FIN. STUD. 2015 at 8.
114
See Particia H. Lee, Crowdfunding Capital in the Age of Blockchain-Based
Tokens, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 833, 887–88 (2018). Note that this format does not
to apply to private sales. See Park Yield LLC v. Brown, No. 18 Civ. 1947 at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019). SAFT agreements are often made with private investors
rather than in a public sale. Cf. Scott W Maughan, Utility Token Offerings: Can a
Security Transform into a Non-Security?, 2019 BYU L. REV. 1113, 1135 (2019);
James J. Park, When Are Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the Perplexed
5 (UCLA Law-Econ Research Paper 18-13) (2018).
115
Boreiko et al., supra note 63, at 680. See also Lars Klöhn et al., Initial Coin
Offerings (ICOs): Economics and Regulation 41 (Nov. 26, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3290882 [https://perma.cc/EL7D-LSLQ]
(arguing that tokens are securities under European regulation if they are
standardized and negotiable on capital markets, where utility tokens are
considered securities depending on the extent of decentralization, the purpose of
the token sale, and their network functions).
116
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT”
ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS (2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/frameworkinvestment-contract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/XS72-69QR]. See
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implement the Howey test in a two-step process.117 First, apply a
so-called “Bahamas Test,”118 which asks whether the token is
sufficiently decentralized, so that the “effort of others” condition is
not fulfilled.119 Second, apply the so-called “Substantial Steps Test,”
which focuses on expectation of profit.120 Along similar lines, Thijs
Maas argues that most tokens constitute securities, but a test looking
at the degree of decentralization can be useful for identifying
exceptions.121 A recent proposal by the SEC, titled “Rule 195,”
suggests a three-year grace period followed by applying the usual
Howey test, subject to some guarantees of good faith by the token
issuer.122
As the United States remains conflicted regarding the right
policy, legislators have started taking an active interest in adopting
definitions and establishing an official token taxonomy. In 2019, a
flood of state bills called for recognition and promotion of
blockchain technology and virtual tokens, with over thirty states (as

also Jonathan L. Marcus et al., Recent Cryptocurrency Regulatory Developments,
38 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL’Y REP. 1, 1–2 (Sept. 2019) (noting that the SEC’s
guidance “identifies 38 separate considerations, listing sub-points under many of
them”).
117
M. Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital
Assets: Toward an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and
Other Digital Assets, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 450 (2019).
118
The name “Bahamas test” refers to a thought exercise asking whether the
project would continue to exist if its creator would run away to the Bahamas. Id.
Then, if the project is self-sustaining and does not depend on the creator, the test
concludes that the risk of fraud is reduced so that the token should not be classified
as a security. Id. at 461.
119
The connection between decentralization and a security status lies in
whether there is an explicit or implicit contract that is created when one purchases
the token. See id.
120
Id. at 483.
121
Thijs Maas, Initial Coin Offerings: When Are Tokens Securities in the EU and
US? 47 (Feb. 13, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3337514
[https://perma.cc/95BE-HEYR].
122
Hester M. Pierce, Running on Empty: A Proposal to Fill the Gap Between
Regulation and Decentralization, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-blockress-2020-02-06
[https://perma.cc/8NFQ-Z878].
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of March 2020) adopting related decisions.123 In December 2019, the
U.S. Senate Committee of Commerce, Science, and Transportation
established a working group tasked with developing blockchainrelated definitions.124 FinCEN (the financial crimes enforcement
agency network at the Department of the Treasury) released
guidelines that aim to help businesses decide whether a token is a
currency for the purpose of money transmissions.125
At the peak of the policy initiatives relating to taxonomy lies a
new bill titled the “Crypto-Currency Act of 2020,” which was
submitted to Congress in early March 2020.126 The bill proposes to
explicitly adopt the taxonomy discussed above, by differentiating
between three categories: utility (“crypto-commodity”), security
(“crypto-security”), and currency (“crypto-currency”).127 Interestingly,
the bill’s definition of “crypto-commodity” does not seem to include
123

See Shelagh Dolan, How the Laws & Regulations Affecting Blockchain
Technology and Cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin, Can Impact its Adoption, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/blockchain-cryptocurrencyregulations-us-global?r=DE&IR=T [https://perma.cc/F9F2-DQQZ]. South Carolina
adopted a resolution on 10 Mar. 2020 (SC S1158); Rhode Island adopted a
resolution on 11 Mar. 2020. See Jason Brett, Legislation In Rhode Island Bets On
Blockchain Growth To Drive Economic Policy, FORBES (Mar. 15, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/03/15/legislation-in-rhode-islandbets-on-blockchain-growth-to-drive-economic-policy/#636c2cca4e2f
[https://perma.cc/KJM6-ZEQ7].
124
Blockchain Promotion Act of 2019, H.R. 1361, 116th Cong. (2019)
(establishing “a working group to recommend to Congress a definition of
blockchain technology”).
125
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL CRIMES ENF’T
NETWORK, FIN-2019-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO
CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS INVOLVING CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL CURRENCIES
(2019), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05/FinCEN%20Guidance%
20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf [https://perma.cc/9E83-SB28] (providing regulatory
guidelines that explain when cryptotokens are currency). For an overview, see
Osato Avan-Nomayo, FinCEN Unveils New Bitcoin Guidelines: Here’s What You
Need to Know, BITCOINIST (May 11, 2019), https://bitcoinist.com/bitcoin-cryptofincen-guidlines-new [https://perma.cc/L9AH-B43D].
126
Crypto-Currency Act of 2020, H.R. 5889, 116th Cong. (2020).
127
For discussions of the new bill, see Tony Spilotro, New Cryptocurrency Act
in Congress Classifies Assets into Three Distinct Groups, NEWSBTC (Mar. 11,
2020), https://www.newsbtc.com/2020/03/11/new-cryptocurrency-act-congress
[https://perma.cc/H2K6-37JN].
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all utility tokens, as only tokens whose value is independent of the
identity of the issuer are considered a commodity.128 Still, the
direction of the proposal is clear: a trio of categories will be used to
differentiate between tokens. The bill, which was presented to
Congress on March 9, 2020, has received mixed reactions—where
some argue that the bill is unlikely to pass, while others identified a
wave of support from entrepreneurs and regulators.129
Other countries have adopted different approaches, taking
various stances on how tokens should be classified.130 For instance,
Bermuda views tokens as a security only if there is promise of future
profit;131 Colombia views all tokens as non-securities;132 Anguilla
does not consider utility tokens to be securities, but has set a specific
regulation for such tokens;133 Germany has issued elaborate rules
which classify most tokens as financial instruments;134 and France
has classified Bitcoin as a “fungible intangible asset,” i.e., as a
regular currency.135 The new EU digital finance package entails a
proposal that largely adopts the three categories of utility, security,
128

H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. § 2(1)(b) (2008).
See Jason Brett, U.S. Blockchain Entrepreneurs Support Crypto-Currency Act
of 2020 Despite Pressure From D.C. Lobbyists, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/03/14/us-blockchain-entrepreneur
s-support-crypto-currency-act-of-2020-despite-pressure-from-dclobbyists/#7065a0df5945 [https://perma.cc/L45A-K9RX]; Daniel Kuhn, The
Cryptocurrency Act of 2020 Is ‘Dead on Arrival,’ Washington Tells Sponsors,
COINDESK (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/the-cryptocurrency-actof-2020-is-dead-on-arrival-washington-dc-tells-sponsors?amp=1&__twitter_imp
ression=true [https://perma.cc/73YF-KXW9].
130
GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 57.
131
Id. at 8.
132
Id. at 12–13.
133
Id. at 20.
134
Virtual Currencies (VC), BAFIN, https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/FinTech
/VirtualCurrency/virtual_currency_node_en.html [https://perma.cc/R8EF-DZXB]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
135
In a recent case, a court in Nanterre rejected a lender’s claim in tokens that
a borrower received during a so-called “hard fork” of Bitcoin (where new tokens
were handed out to the holder of existing tokens), based on the notion that Bitcoins
are currencies, so that their proceeds do not belong to the lender. See Lujan Odera,
Bitcoin (BTC) Is a Legal Form of Currency, French Courts Rules, COINGAPE
(Mar. 6, 2020), https://coingape.com/france-courts-rules-bitcoin-btc-is-a-fungible-asset
-similar-to-fiat-currencies/ [https://perma.cc/DJ2U-UFBS].
129
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and currency.136 Thus, the classification of tokens remains subject to
some legal uncertainty.137
With that said, the new initiatives described above indicate that
regulators believe that preceeding with no taxonomy for tokens is
probably far worse than taxonomies implimented elsewhere. This
belief is especially true for the question of whether rights should be
protected by property or liability rules. A lack of taxonomy does,
however, emerge in the case law, as discussed in the following
section.
III. ENTITLEMENTS IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES: CASE LAW AND
LITERATURE
A. Case law
Considering the rising popularity of cryptocurrencies, legal
disputes surrounding various entitlements began to emerge in U.S.
courts. However, rulings have been somewhat inconsistent. In the
case of Currier v. PDL Recovery Group, LLC,138 a creditor filed a
request to liquidate Bitcoin and Ether tokens held by the defendant
via an online wallet at a crypto exchange.139 The district court
determined that the tokens are the defendant’s intangible personal
property and refused to grant a liquidation order, among else,
because the tokens were held by a crypto exchange, which is a third
party.140 In another case, a court-appointed receiver recovered tokens
from the hands of a third party, where these tokens were first
136

See the text in supra note 69.
For a criticism of the lack of consistency in the U.S. regulation, see Lukas
Hofer, Legal Limbo: U.S. Blockchain Regulations Fragmented and Undeveloped,
BLOCKCHAIN LAND (Mar. 2, 2020), https://theblockchainland.com/2020/03/02/legallimbo-us-blockchain-regulations-fragmented-undeveloped [https://perma.cc/3YDKYTP6]. For a discussion of the approach adopted in the European Union, see
Ferrari, supra note 69, at 329.
138
Currier v. PDL Recovery Grp. LLC, No. 14-12179, 2018 WL 4057394, at
*1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 2018).
139
Id. at *1.
140
Id. at *2 (stating that “the Court’s ability to order satisfaction of a judgment
with a defendant’s personal property that is in possession of a third party is
limited” and that “Plaintiff seeks the liquidation of intangible personal property—
Defendant’s cryptocurrency accounts with Coinbase”).
137
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fraudulently extracted from the original owner.141 These rulings
seem to adopt a clear property rule.
Conversely, in Temurian v. Piccolo,142 a Florida district court
refused to acknowledge Bitcoin and Ether as property, based on the
notion that the tokens are equivalent to money and are not specifically
identifiable.143 In two other cases, requests for temporary injunctions
regarding tokens were rejected because the plaintiffs failed to meet
the necessary evidentiary standard.144 While these cases did not
formally review the question of property rights, their outcomes are
consistent with a reversed property rule, where the alleged infringer
is the one who retains ownership.145
Yet, a liability rule is imposed in a different set of cases. In
Smoak v. Bitcoin Market, LLC,146 a plaintiff was temporarily denied
access to Bitcoins that were held in a wallet at a crypto exchange.
As the defendant failed to respond, the court granted a default
verdict awarding the plaintiff damages at the amount equal to the
Bitcoin’s price at the time.147 Similarly, in Day v. Boyer,148 a plaintiff
141

Rasmussen v. Smith, No. 3:18-CV-01034-M, 2020 WL 109863, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 8, 2020).
142
Temurian v. Piccolo, No. 18-CV-62737, 2019 WL 1763022, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 22, 2019).
143
The plaintiff’s claim relied on a “conversion” argument under Florida law,
which requires, among else, that money is identifiable. Id. The court ruled that the
diversion of thousands of dollars in value are not enough to establish that the funds
are identifiable. Id.
144
In MacDonald v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 17-CV-07095-RS, 2017
WL 6513439 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017), the plaintiff transferred Bitcoin and Ether
to the defendant in exchange for other tokens in an ICO. Based on various claims,
the plaintiff demanded to freeze the tokens that were transferred. Id. at *3. In ZG
TOP Tech. Co. v. Doe, No. C19-92-RAJ, 2019 WL 917418 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25,
2019), an anonymous hacker managed to take control of Tether and Ether tokens
owned by the plaintiff and transfer them to a wallet managed at a crypto-exchange.
Id. at *1. The court rejected the plaintiff’s request to freeze the account. Id. at *3.
145
Both a rule granting the plaintiff an injunction and a rule of no remedy reflect
a property rule: a party is allowed to hold on to the token without the consent of
the opposite party. For simplicity, this Author refers to the (property) rule favoring
the defendant as a “reversed property rule.”
146
No. CIV-18-1096-PRW, at *2 (W.D. Okla. 2018).
147
Id. at *9.
148
Day v. Boyer, No. 19-CV-01669, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9959, at *12 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 21, 2020).
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who purchased tokens but did not receive them was awarded with
damages.149 In the case of Rensel v. Centra Tech., Inc.,150 investors
in an ICO demanded to receive damages in the amount equal to the
worth of Bitcoin and Ether transferred to the defendant.151 The Court
did not seem to consider the possibility of returning the specific
tokens transferred (which would be required under a property rule)
and instead awarded the plaintiffs damages.152
Interestingly, none of these cases—neither those that implement
a property rule nor those that implement a liability rule—dedicate
any attention for the possible need to distinguish between different
types of tokens. A lack of distinction between different types of
tokens arises not only in the United States but also in some other
jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, a high court classified
Bitcoins as property and granted an injunction against a crypto
exchange regarding tokens that were extracted through illegal
extortion.153 Thereby, a property rule was implemented.154 A
property rule also emerges in two Canadian cases.155 In the first case,
a court ordered a defendant to return a misappropriated computer in
which private keys were stored, based on a propriety argument.156 In
the second case, a court determined that Ether that was transferred
by mistake should be returned to its original owner.157 In the first
case, the court explicitly acknowledged the plaintiff’s proprietary
interest in the laptop which contained the private key as well as in
149

As the court entered a default judgement, the proprietary issues were not
fully deliberated. Still, the court did determine that damages are the appropriate
remedy, even for a claim of theft regarding the tokens. Id. at *3–4.
150
No. 17-24500-CIV, 2018 WL 4410126, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2018).
151
Id. at *5 (“Because investors invested using BTC or ETH, the Securities Act
requires that Plaintiffs' Section 12 damages be calculated in terms of BTC or
ETH.”).
152
Id.
153
AA v. Persons Unknown & Ors, Re Bitcoin [2019] EWHC (Comm) 3556
[50–63] (U.K.).
154
Id.
155
For a review of the two cases, see Janis Sarra & Louise Gullifer QC (Hon),
Crypto-claimants and Bitcoin Bankruptcy: Challenges for Recognition and
Realization, 28 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 233, 246–48 (2019).
156
Shair.Com Glob. Digit. Servs. Ltd. v. Arnold, [2018] CanLII 1512, para. 13–
17 (Can. B.C.S.C.).
157
Copytrack Pte Ltd. v. Wall, [2018] CanLII 1709 (Can. B.C.S.C.).
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the tokens themselves.158 In the second case, a property right was not
explicitly acknowledged, but the outcome was nonetheless
consistent with a property rule.159
Contrarily, in a case in Singapore, a defendant converted
Bitcoins to Ether using an incorrect exchange rate and then reversed
the trade unilaterally to avoid a loss.160 There, the court similarly
classified the cryptocurrencies as property,161 but then rejected the
plaintiff’s demand of specific performance (i.e., of receiving the
tokens) and awarded damages instead.162 Thus, a liability rule was
adopted.163

158

Shair.Com Glob. Digit. Servs. Ltd., CanLII 1512 at para. 15 (“The plaintiff
has established that it has a claim to a proprietary interest in the laptop computer
and in any digital currencies purchased by the defendant flowing from the
plaintiff’s initial $18,500 investment in Bitcoin.”). Note that because the
defendant did not dispute the plaintiff’s rights, the decision did not conduct a full
analysis of this point. Id.
159
Copytrack Pte Ltd. v. Wall, CanLII 1709 at para. 37 (“In my view, the
appropriate remedy is therefore [….] as follows: An order that Copytrack be
entitled to trace and recover the 529.8273791 Ether Tokens received by Wall from
Copytrack on 15 February 2018 in whatsoever hands those Ether Tokens may
currently be held.”).
160
B2C2 Limited v. Quoine PTC Ltd., [2019] SGHC (I) 03 [142] (2019) (Sing.).
161
Id. For a discussion of whether Bitcoin can be stolen according to
Singapore’s law, published prior to said case, see generally Koh Thiam Kwee,
Can You Steal Bitcoin?: Lessons for Singapore from the UK and New Zealand,
36 SING. L. REV. 186, 192 (2018–2019) (explaining that cryptotokens’ status as
property under Singapore’s criminal law means that stealing bitcoin is not
punishable). For reviews of the case itself, see generally Jeremiah Lau,
Computerised Mistake and Proprietised Bitcoin: B2C2 v. Quoine Pte Ltd., 35
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 205 (2019) (discussing the central issues addressed by
the court in the case); Hans Tjio, Securities and Financial Services Regulation,
19 SING. ACAD. L. ANN. REV. 738, 752 n.50 (2018).
162
B2C2 Limited v. Quoine PTC Limited, at § 255–57.
163
Id. In civil law countries, litigation seems to have not picked up yet, so that
there is little indication on which directions courts will proceed in. One exception
is a 2015 case in Japan, which rejected a creditor’s claim that Bitcoin held by a
bankrupt exchange was the creditor’s property. See Tang Hang Wu, Trustees’
Investment Duties and Cryptoassets, 26 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 183, 189 (2020).
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B. Existing literature
Several academic scholars have addressed the difficulty of
recognizing cryptocurrencies as property, but they have also alluded
to a general intuition that a property rule should apply. For instance,
Michael Ng stipulates that in the case of theft, “there is every reason
to characterize the issue between them as proprietary,”164 as
otherwise, the victim has no other direct link to a third party who
purchases the tokens from the thief.165 David Fox has asserted
similarly that even if a transaction is irreversible in the technical
sense (because the distributed ledger is immutable), the registration
stored on the blockchain does not provide information about
whether the transaction was lawful.166 Thus, he argues that property
law should allow recovery of tokens that are “stolen or transferred
by fraud.”167
Generally, Fox’s argument is that existing property law can (and
sometimes should) also apply to tokens, either directly—by treating
tokens as a special case of intangible assets—or by analogy.168 For
the case of transfers to third parties, this application of property law
to tokens means that one can apply the usual “rules of derivative
transfer”:169 a person who does not have a legal right cannot confer
it to another (as captured by the maxim nemo dat quod non habet),
so that the original lawful owner will keep a legal property right that
is enforceable against third parties.170
Several scholars point out other conceptual and practical
difficulties of treating Bitcoin as property, for instance, due to
“blanket liens”;171 if banks gain an interest in all the property of a
164

Ng, supra note 40, at 322.
Id.
166
Fox, supra note 40, at 19–21.
167
Id. at 27.
168
Id. at 19.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 19–20.
171
A blanket lien is a typical arrangement between banks and borrowers, which
allows the bank to seize any type of assets owned by a debtor in case of nonpayment. See Blanket Lien, FREE DICTIONARY, https://financial-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/Blanket+Lien [https://perma.cc/UQ36-RFY3] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2021).
165
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business, then once the business receives Bitcoin as payment, the
lien applies automatically and hinders liquidity.172 Janis Sarra and
Louise Gullifer investigate whether Bitcoin is considered property
for the purpose of insolvency law.173 They propose to view Bitcoin
as property notwithstanding the conceptual difficulties, given that
Bitcoin is an asset that has value.174 Earlier discussions in the
literature also reach a similar conclusion, i.e., that Bitcoin can be
perceived as property.175
While the legal discussion seems to be extensive, neither the
courts nor the academic literature reviewed above dedicated
particular attention to aspects of efficiency. Some scholarly work
does consider the role of TC in the trade of Bitcoin, but its analysis
is done mostly in comparison to fiat money176 and not with respect
to other tokens.177 Jonathan Turpin highlights that cryptocurrencies
172

See Evan Hewitt, Bringing Continuity to Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law
as a Guide to the Asset Categorization of Bitcoin, 39 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 619,
629–30 (2016); Gely-Rojas, supra note 16, at 138–40.
173
Sarra & Gullifer QC (Hon), supra note 155, at 242.
174
Id. at 251.
175
See Paul N. McCullum, Bitcoin: Property or Currency?, 148 TAX NOTES
867, 867 (2015); Petter Hurich, The Virtual is Real: An Argument for
Characterizing Bitcoins as Private Property, 31 BANKING. & FIN. L. REV. 573,
574–75 (2016); Scott A. Wiseman, Property or Currency: The Tax Dilemma
Behind Bitcoin, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 417, 418 (2016); Kelvin FK Low & Ernie GS
Teo, Bitcoins and Other Cryptocurrencies as Property?, 9 L. INNOV. TECH. 235,
242 (2017); Jeanne L Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 78 (2015).
176
“Fiat money” is the common term used by many to refer to traditional, noncryptographic, currencies. See Fiat Money, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 18, 2021)
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fiatmoney.asp [https://perma.cc/2WA9-GXJ3].
177
See, e.g., Saurabh Ahluwalia et al., Blockchain Technology and Startup
Financing: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 151 TECH. FORECASTING
& SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (2020) (comparing the transactions costs in crypto
transactions to those in traditional financing methods). For empirical evidence,
see generally Thomas Kim, On the Transaction Cost of Bitcoin, 23 FIN. RES.
LETTERS 300 (2017) (examining the transactional costs associated with Bitcoin);
Anne H. Dyhrberg et al., How Investible is Bitcoin? Analyzing the Liquidity and
Transaction Costs of Bitcoin Markets. 171 ECON. LETTERS 140 (2018) (finding
empirical evidence of lower explicit transaction costs in the form of bid-ask
spreads). See also Sebastien Meunier & Danni Zhao-Meunier, Bitcoin,
Distributed Ledgers and the Theory of the Firm (Jan. 20, 2019) (unpublished
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are typically related to lower TC compared to fiat money (e.g., due
to the possibility of making micro-payments for a reduced fee), but
also emphasizes the risk that uninformed individuals will fall victim
to fraud and theft (which implies higher TC).178 Eric Engle similarly
alludes to the lower TC, but argues that these also facilitate
transactions by criminals, leading to negative externalities.179
Sinclair Davidson et al. review how one of blockchain technology’s
main benefits is reducing TC, in particular through the transparency
of the ledger, which enables decentralized monitoring and reduces
opportunism.180 Lesïaw Pietrewicz reviews how blockchain relates
to TC, but restricts attention to utility tokens and does not consider
property rights.181
Thus, although the literature seems to identify that TC are
important for the trade of cryptotokens, the next step—examining
how property rights should be assigned—has not yet been taken. In
the following section, this Article connects the (thus far disparate)
discussions of property rights in cryptotokens, TC, and token
taxonomy. Doing so will then allow this Article to discuss the
lessons that a law and economics approach can provide for the issue
at hand.

manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3327971
[https://perma.cc/9Z53XMMA].
178
Jonathan B. Turpin, Bitcoin: The Economic Case for a Global, Virtual
Currency Operating in an Unexplored Legal Framework, 21 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL
STUD. 335, 350 (2014).
179
Eric Engle, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison: Cryptocurrency, Crime, and
Counterfeiting (CCC), 16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 340, 345 (2016).
180
Sinclair Davidson et al., Blockchains and the Economic Institutions of
Capitalism. 14 J. INST. ECON. 639, 651 (2018).
181
Lesïaw Pietrewicz, Token-Based Blockchain Financing and Governance: A
Transaction Cost Economics Approach, 2/2018 STUDIA I MATERIAŁY 126, 134–
36 (2018).

422

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 3

IV. WHAT LAW AND ECONOMICS HAS TO SAY: A DISCUSSION
A. Coase theorem and transaction costs
From a law and economics perspective, there seems to be no
conceptual difficulty in treating tokens as property.182 Namely,
economic theory stipulates that “private goods” can (and should) be
privately owned.183 A “private good” is a good which fulfills two
conditions: it must be rivalrous, so that using the good detracts from
the ability of others to use it, and it must be excludible, so that the
owner can prevent others from simultaneously using the good at a
sufficiently low cost.184 In the case of tokens, both conditions seem
easily satisfied: holding a token precludes others from using it at the
same time (so that it is rivalrous), and allows the holder to exclude
others, as the holder has exclusive access to his private key.185
As there is no conceptual problem, a law and economics analysis
would instead shift the focus from the definition of what property is
to the question of how to assign and protect the rights of token
holders. Generally, when scholars of law and economics approach
the topic of property rights, the starting point is the theorem
developed by one of the discipline’s fathers—Nobel Prize winner,
Ronald Coase.186 The Coase Theorem187 builds on the foundations of

182

Recall that tokens are generally designed as a scarce resource, e.g., by using
algorithmic methods that reduce the speed in which new tokens are created. For a
discussion on the scarcity of Bitcoin, see, e.g., Samuel Elliott, Bitcoin: The First
Self-Regulating Currency, 3 LSE L. REV. 57, 64 (2018).
183
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 103 (stating that “[e]fficiency
requires that private goods should be privately owned and that public goods
should be publicly owned”).
184
See id. at 102–05. The ability to exclude others and detract from others’
usage ensures that trade may be desirable. If the sellers do not have the ability to
exclude others, or if others can simply use the good simultaneously, then potential
buyers will not be willing to pay to purchase the good.
185
Rueckert, supra note 37, at 7.
186
Sarah Galer & Jeremy Manier, Ronald H. Coase, Founding Scholar in Law
and Economics, 1910-2013, UNIV. CHI. L. SCH. (Sept. 2, 2013), https://www.
law.uchicago.edu/news/ronald-h-coase-founding-scholar-law-and-economics1910-2013 [https://perma.cc/7DUA-2V9E] (explaining that “Ronald H. Coase
helped create the field of law and economics . . .”).
187
See supra Part I (providing an explanation about the Coase Theorem).

APR 2021]

Property Rights in Cryptocurrencies

423

cooperative game theory188 and provides a prediction for when an
efficient allocation of property rights is achieved.189 The traditional
example used is one in which a farmer’s fields might be damaged
by his neighbor rancher’s cattle, where both parties can prevent the
damage but one of them can accomplish it at a lower cost.190 The
theorem argues that, if the parties successfully negotiate, they will
realize that it is mutually beneficial for the person who can prevent
the harm in a cheaper way to do so, as this negotiation creates a
surplus that the parties can divide between them.191 As a result, it
will not matter whether the rancher or the farmer has a legal
obligation to prevent the harm, meaning, it does not matter to whom
the state allocates a property right, as the outcome ex-post will
always be efficient.192 However, the theorem acknowledges that this
efficiency only holds when negotiations are feasible, which requires
zero (or very low) TC.193
A first insight for the context of cryptotokens may be that if one
believes that there are zero TC, it does not matter who owns the
token initially and whether a liability rule or property rule is applied.
Then, the case law mentioned above would set a precedent that is
neither beneficial nor harmful.
However, as the cryptocurrency market may well entail various
TC, a more detailed analysis that allows for adjusting the rule to the

188

Cooperative game theory focuses on joint outcomes that are achieved
through coalitions of individuals. It differs from non-cooperative game theory,
which instead focuses on strategic interactions in which each individual
maximizes his own payoff. See Senka Hadzic et al., Cooperative Game Theory
and its Application in Localization Algorithms, in GAME THEORY RELAUNCHED
173, 175–77 (Hardy Hanappi ed., 2013).
189
Some of the literature highlights an additional aspect related to the Coase
Theorem: Parties are more likely to successfully bargain when property rights are
clear and unambiguous. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 89. As the ambiguity
of property rights in cryptocurrencies is largely the same across all tokens (given
the legal uncertainty that governs disputes), it is less relevant for the discussion of
varying transaction costs, which is at the heart of this article.
190
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 88.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 85.
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circumstances is in order.194 In this context, it is important to define
exactly what TC include. Several definitions for transaction costs
can be found in the literature,195 but for the purpose of this analysis,
this discussion will restrict attention to the most common
categorization by Carl Dahlman,196 which divides such costs into
three categories: (1) search and information costs; (2) bargaining
and decision costs; and (3) policing and enforcement costs.197
“Search and information costs” arise due to imperfect
information about the availability of trading opportunities or
characteristics of tradeable items.198 For instance, if the token holder
is not fully informed about the demand for his token or does not
know where potential buyers reside, tracking down a suitable buyer
may involve some costs. Furthermore, a token holder must fully
understand which benefits the token brings—otherwise, he will not
be able to properly evaluate who might be interested in trading.
“Bargaining and decision costs” arise when there is imperfect
information about the counterpart’s willingness to trade at given
prices and conditions, or when resources must be spent to determine
whether the terms of the trade are mutually agreeable.199 For
instance, if the token holder has already located a potential buyer,
he may still need to incur costs to determine the exact willingness to
194

Transaction costs in cryptocurrencies may take many forms. See infra, Part
IV.C. For instance, explicit transaction costs arise when trading in ERC-20 tokens
on the Ethereum blockchain in the form of a “gas charge.” See Cohney et al.,
supra note 89. For each action, one (predefined) party must pay a certain amount
of Ether tokens. Id.
195
See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUS. ORG. 135, 137–38 (1989); David A. Lesmond et al., A New Estimate of
Transaction Costs, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 1113, 1114 (1999); David M. Driesen &
Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost
Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 62 (2005). See also
Douglas W. Allen, Transaction costs, 1999 ENCYC. L. & ECON. 893, 893–94
(1999) (arguing that some interpret “transaction costs” widely, as “all laws, rules,
social customs and organizations that generate incentives for behavior,” whereas
others use a narrow definition).
196
Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148
(1979).
197
Id.
198
Id. at 147–48.
199
Id.
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pay of that buyer. Explicit bargaining costs may also be, for
example, in the form of lawyer fees or tolls incurred for completing
the transfer (e.g., fees for registering transactions in land registries).
Finally, “policing and enforcement costs” arise when it is
unclear whether the parties will breach the contract.200 For instance,
if the token holder and a willing buyer sign a written agreement
promising to transfer the tokens under some specific circumstance,
the buyer may fear that the seller will breach his promise and then
refuse to trade. As explained below, this type of cost seems
somewhat less relevant for cryptotokens, given the possibility to use
so-called “smart contracts”: algorithms that automatically transfer
tokens conditioned on the fulfillment of mutually agreed terms.201 If
enforcement is automatic, transaction costs should be drastically
reduced.202
It is, of course, also possible to break down TC into a more
detailed framework that focuses on their determinants,203 but for the
sake of brevity, this discussion shall be restricted to the
aforementioned three categories. As mentioned previously, the
extent to which TC are present determines whether the assignment
of property rights should affect efficiency. If TC are non-zero,
scholars of law and economics typically argue that the law should
instead try to allocate the right to the person who most values the
good, meaning, who would have ended up with the good had TC
200

Note that some scholars use the term “monitoring” instead of “policing.”
Compare id. at 148, with Wim Marneffe & Lode Vereeck, The Meaning of
Regulatory Costs, 32 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 341, 344 (2011).
201
Massimiliano Vatiero, Smart Contracts and Transaction Costs, at 6 (Sept. 8,
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259958 [https://perma.
cc/6WSE-YCGT].
202
See Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Some Simple Economics of the
Blockchain, 63 COMM. ACM 80, 82 (2020); Sina Shahab & Allam Zaheer,
Reducing Transaction Costs of Tradable Permit Schemes Using Blockchain
Smart Contracts, 51 GROWTH & CHANGE 302, 306 (2020). But see infra Part IV.C
0(presenting also some counterarguments).
203
For instance, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 88–91, for a list of
factors which lead to low transaction costs. These include: standardized goods or
services; clear and simple rights; fewer parties; parties who are friendly,
reasonable, and familiar to each other; instantaneous exchange; fewer
contingencies; low costs of monitoring; and cheap punishments in case of breach. Id.
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been zero.204 A related prescription says that, if TC are non-zero,
lawmakers should examine who the cheapest cost avoider is and
then grant an entitlement in the good to the opposite side.205 This
method ensures that the party who can prevent the harm at the lowest
cost will have an incentive to do so.
While the Coase Theorem shines the spotlight on how
transaction costs can affect who should be given an entitlement, it
does not yield an explicit recipe of how to protect an entitlement
once it is assigned. The next section thus discusses the follow-up
question of how to protect the entitlement from violations, in other
words, whether one should impose a property rule or a liability rule.
B. Property rules or liability rules
In their highly influential paper, Calabresi and Melamed lay out
the relationship between property rules, liability rules, and TC.206 In
a nutshell, they argue that a property rule should be implemented
when TC are low, as Coasean bargaining will then lead to an
efficient outcome.207 Respectively, when TC are high, a liability rule
should be imposed instead.208 As mentioned in the introduction, the
key distinction between the two rules is whether a right can be
204

Id. at 103–04.
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal
Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9
(2013). For the application of the concept in tort law, see also Mary Lou Serafine.
Repudiated Compromise After Breach, 100 YALE L.J. 2229, 2237 (1991); COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 25, at 354. See generally Peder Østbye, Who is Causally
Responsible for a Cryptocurrency? (Mar. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339537 [https://perma.cc/V27V-DKFY] (discussing
causal responsibility for harm related to blockchain).
206
Id. at 1094 (explaining Coasean bargaining refers to bargaining under zero
transaction costs, as in the Coase theorem). For a discussion of the Coase theorem,
see id. at 1094 n.12, 1118 n.59.
207
Coasean bargaining refers to bargaining under zero transaction costs, as in
the Coase Theorem. For uses of the term “Coasean Bargaining,” see, for example,
John J. Donohue, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't
Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1991);
Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 948 (2000).
208
See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9 (discussing not only
efficiency, but also discussing distributions and other justice-related
considerations).
205

APR 2021]

Property Rights in Cryptocurrencies

427

non-voluntarily transferred.209 A property rule prevents non-voluntary
transactions by enabling the person whose rights are infringed to
obtain an injunction, whereas a liability rule allows for nonvoluntary transfers if the original right holder is compensated.210 The
decision criterion for choosing between a property rule and a
liability rule depends on whether there are obstacles for trade (i.e.,
TC),211 where high TC support a liability rule and low TC support a
property rule.
This criterion offers a clear prescription but is subject to some
limitations.212 First, liability rules require courts to calculate
damages, whereas property rules just dictate that the court should
grant an injunction.213 If the calculation of damages is either costly
or imperfect (e.g., because the harm is difficult to estimate), the
administrative costs alone may support the imposition of a property
rule instead.214 Second, a property rule merely implies that someone
should get the entitlement but does not say who that person is (the
plaintiff, the defendant, or none of them).215 Thus, the choice
between injunction and no-injunction may also require
administrative costs (calculating the value of the good to each
party).216 Considering these difficulties, Robert Cooter and Thomas
209

See supra note 12.
See supra note 11.
211
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 100.
212
Id.
213
See id. at 96 (“[T]he right to an injunction should be regarded as a clear
assignment of a property right.”); Emily Sherwin, Introduction: Property Rules
as Remedies, 106 YALE L.J. 2083, 2085 (1996) (“[T]the great body of property
rules are enforced by courts through equitable remedies such as injunctions . . . .”).
214
See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J.
271, 271–72 (1979) (arguing that damages may be hard to compute, especially for
unique goods, leading to imperfect compensation); Gerrit De Geest, N Problems
Require N Instruments, 35 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 42, 47 (2013) https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2079747 [https://perma.cc/2KQB-7U5P] (stating that
“damages are no more than rough guesses. They can be substantially
undercompensatory or overcompensatory in individual cases”).
215
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092.
216
In order to figure out whether TC are sufficiently high to preclude
agreements, the court must assess what is the surplus that can be achieved through
negotiations. See id. This requires, among other things, an estimation of the
210
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Ulen propose to adopt the following rule for the case when TC are
high:217 the court should grant an injunction (i.e., implement a
property rule) if it knows which party values the good relatively
more, but should grant damages (i.e., a liability rule) if it knows how
much one of the parties values the good absolutely.218
A final aspect of the paper by Calabresi and Melamed, that is
relevant for the discussion herein, is so-called “inalienability” rules,
which prohibit some transfers even when both parties to the
transaction trade willingly.219 For instance, if a court decided to grant
an injunction against a third party (e.g., a crypto exchange) the result
indirectly imposes an inalienability rule for the transaction between
the hacker and the client of the exchange. Note that such rules may
make sense when there are serious externalities, for example, when
a trade causes massive harm to others (here, to the original owner).
Two specific cases of externalities are then relevant here. First,
inalienability rules can protect the original owner, in the case that
the damage he incurs is non-monetizable, due to a fear of imperfect
compensation.220 Second, when goods are appropriated through theft
(or blackmail), insisting on inalienability protects the integrity of the
legal system from arbitrary impositions of liability rules.221 This
reasoning can also be related back to TC: a thief may steal precisely
because TC are too high, so that acquiring the good through
negotiations is not feasible.
Calabresi and Melamed’s conclusions regarding the relationship
between TC and the choice of property versus liability rules have
been thoroughly discussed by later work, yielding some refinements

valuation of each party. See id. at 1093 (highlighting the role of administrative
costs for the choice of granting entitlements).
217
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 101.
218
The intuition for this distinction is as follows: if trade is hindered by TC, it
is better to instead imitate the result that would have occurred had zero-TC trade
taken place, by granting the right to the one who values the good most. Id.
However, when the court has difficulties identifying which party values the good
more but does know the exact valuation of at least one party, it should prefer to
save on the administrative costs and instead award damages. Id.
219
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1112.
220
See id.
221
See id. at 1126.
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in support of the theory as well as some criticism,222 but their
analysis remains a central figure in the economic analysis of law,
providing a framework to evaluate how entitlements in
cryptocurrencies should be protected.223
C. Applying the right rule
Consider the following example: Alice owns 100 tokens, which
she is planning to transfer to another account. Bob secretly hacks
into Alice’s computer and switches the address of the target account,
causing Alice to transfer the tokens to Bob’s account instead of the
intended account. Bob quickly transfers the tokens again to Carol.
Alice files for an injunction against Carol, demanding to receive her
tokens back.
From an efficiency perspective, the main goal is to adopt a rule
that ensures that the token ends up in the hands of the individual who
values it the most (either Alice or Carol). The first question is then
whether there are barriers to negotiation and trade between Alice
and Carol, i.e., are TC too high? To answer this question, one must
consider the three categories of TC: (1) search and information
costs, (2) bargaining and decision costs, and (3) enforcement costs.
In some cases, it is clear that search costs are low. For example,
if a token is traded on a crypto exchange, there is liquidity and a
publicly available market price,224 reducing the need to search for a
prospective buyer. Both Carol and Alice presumably then have a
low search cost for other buyers. If Carol, who currently holds the
222
See Arial Porat, Economics of Remedies, 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK L. & ECON.
308, 312–13 (2017); Yun-Chien Chang, Optional Law in Property: Theoretical
Critiques and a New View of the Cathedral, 9 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 459, 463–
64 (2015).
223
See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 100; Vincent SJ Buccola,
Bankruptcy’s Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Distress, 114 NW.
U.L. REV. 705, 724 (2019); Limor Riza, Rawls, Taxation and Calabresi &
Melamed’s Rules, 15 REV. L. & ECON. 43, 44 (2019); Andrew W. Torrance & Bill
Tomlinson, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Patents: One Experimental View
of the Cathedral, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 138, 146–47 (2011); Richard Craswell,
Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–12 (1993).
224
See generally Wei, supra note 33 (finding no evidence of illiquidity
premiums).
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token, does not value the token the most, she can sell it to any
random buyer on the exchange. If that buyer values the token more
than Alice, it is actually efficient that the token ends up in that
buyer’s hands (although it seems unjust, as Alice’s tokens were
stolen). Conversely, if Alice is the one who most values the token,
she will eventually buy it back from said buyer.
As long as there is an effective channel of trade (in this case, a
crypto exchange), search costs will stay relatively low.
Respectively, tokens that are not listed for trade will imply a high
search cost. An alternative reason for high search costs may be that
Carol cannot be easily located, for example, because Carol actively
attempts to hide her identity. Sometimes, Carol’s anonymity would
even be inherent to the token’s technology,225 making it very costly
(or impossible) for Alice and Carol to negotiate.
Next, bargaining costs would depend on the circumstances. If
Alice and Carol can freely communicate, negotiations are possible.
However, Carol might be, for example, located in another country—
so that negotiations would require compliance with foreign law,226
225
One example would be the underlying privacy mechanism of “Zero Cash,”
also known as “Zcash,” which relies on so-called “zk-SNARKS” or “Zero
Knowledge Proofs.” Eli Ben-Sasson et al., Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous
Payments from Bitcoin, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY
AND PRIVACY 459 (2014). These obscure the identity of the parties to the trade.
See, e.g., Jesse Kloss, Securing Crypto: Exempting Certain Cryptoassets from the
Arkansas Securities Act, 73 ARK. L. REV. 631, 639 (2020) (“Zero cash shields
addresses and balances from being visible on the blockchain”). Noah Walters,
Privacy Law Issues in Public Blockchains: An Analysis of Blockchain, PIPEDA,
The GDPR, and Proposals for Compliance, 17 CANADIAN J.L. & TECH. 276, 297
(2019) (“zk-SNARK technology allows users to hide their identities, transaction
amounts, and account balances . . . .”). The most prominent use case for this
technology is ZeroCash, also known as “Zcash.” The Basics, ZCASH,
https://z.cash/the-basics [https://perma.cc/RJ89-WRH5] (last visited Mar. 5,
2021).
226
For example, suppose that a seller sells a stablecoin to a buyer who resides
in the EU but is incorporated in Switzerland. As the EU and Switzerland have
different definitions of whether a stablecoin is subject to some regulation, e.g., to
KYC procedures. See Thomas A Frick, Virtual and Cryptocurrencies—
Regulatory and Anti-money Laundering Approaches in the European Union and
in Switzerland, 10 ERA F. 99, 101 (2019). The seller is likely to require legal
counsel on which rule applies, leading to legal costs. Id.
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leading to legal costs. Moreover, there may be many different
“Carols,” each holding some of the tokens that were illegally
extracted from Alice. The multiplicity of parties then typically
increases the cost of bargaining.227 Another aspect is information
asymmetries regarding the token’s value, as the parties must figure
out each other’s willingness to trade at a given price. This
informational asymmetry may be complicated if the token’s value is
not standardized, i.e., it will depend on the circumstances.
Finally, enforcement costs depend on how agreements related to
tokens are designed. If transfers are guaranteed technologically
using smart contracts, there are (theoretically) zero enforcement
costs, as the algorithm ensures that the transfer occurs. However, the
parties could face difficulties in programming ad-hoc smart
contracts, either due to lack of technological knowledge (requiring
parties to hire paid experts) or other TC that arise during the
negotiation over the choice of mechanism in the smart contract.228
Moreover, as smart contracts are not adaptable to relevant changes
in the world (as everything is programmed), it has been argued that
TC may increase for that reason.229 This argument relies, among
others, on behavioral grounds such as the parties’ bounded

227

When multiple parties are involved, negotiations can easily become
complex, i.e., because the parties have different interests or different time
constraints. In addition, some parties may try to freeride on others’ negotiation
efforts, which can lead to delays (e.g., parties delaying their responses in
anticipation of others’ behavior) or even to a negotiation breakdown (in the
extreme case where no one invests effort). See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note
25, at 91 (naming “few parties” as a factor that reduces transaction costs).
228
For example, suppose that the parties agree that any amount transferred from
the buyer to the seller will first be transferred to an escrow account. Even if the
parties agree on this concept, the details must be determined (who controls this
account, who programs the smart contract, what happens in case of dispute, and
so on). All the related details are also subject to negotiations and, respectively, to
transaction costs.
229
Vatiero, supra note 201, at 6 (arguing that smart contracts “are constructed
to avoid . . . external adaptation. Hence, although [smart contracts] reduce
uncertainty in economic relationships, they also preclude any ex post efficiencyenhancing adaptation of contractual terms by an external third party.”).
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rationality when designing the smart contract,230 which can prevent
them from addressing the relevant contingencies correctly ex-ante,
thus resulting in disputes ex-post.
From a practical perspective, proper implementation of the
Calabresi and Melamed proposition thus seems to require a
case-by-case distinction, depending on the specific TC that arise.
However, as a case-by-case approach is always costly, a reasonable
middle ground can be to use a proxy for different types of
transactions, such as the existing taxonomy laid out above—
dividing the tokens into utility, security, and currency. As
enforcement costs are unlikely to vary across these categories, the
following analysis will focus on search or information costs and
bargaining or decision costs.
As currency tokens are usually tradeable on exchanges, or
directly accepted as a form of payment, search and information costs
are arguably low, therefore it is very easy to find parties with whom
to trade. Similarly, such tokens are unlikely to have heterogeneous
valuations, so that there is almost no need to ascertain whether the
terms of a transaction in the token itself are mutually agreeable.
However, two issues should be considered. First, agreeing on the
transfer of currency tokens is typically secondary to a main
agreement, where parties negotiate on another matter that involves
tokens as payment. TC would then depend also on the main
agreement. Second, regulators may decide to exploit the fact that
even currency tokens have unique identifiers and can be traced.
For example, Christian Rueckert considers the possibility to
regulate cryptocurrency trade using “blacklists,” which would force
market players to always compare the transaction history of the
token with a public list of suspicious entities who have been accused
of various law violations.231 If such a policy is implemented, the
obligation to check the blacklists would create information costs, as
blacklisted tokens are likely to be in demand only for a lower price.
Nonetheless, there seem to already be some technological solutions
230

See Meunier & Zhao-Meunier, supra note 177, at 28 (noting that “smart
contracts remain inherently incomplete because they are written by boundedly
rational people”).
231
Rueckert, supra note 37, at 3.
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that will circumvent the efficacy of blacklists, for example, the
so-called “Zero Knowledge Proofs” that enable the masking of the
identity of the token’s address.232 Thus, the market may be able to
reduce potential TC through technological improvements. Overall,
for currency tokens, TC are thus plausibly low.
As security tokens might not be traded on an exchange, search
costs may be very high: sellers must locate a suitable buyer who is
willing to invest in the underlying project to which the token is
attached. Moreover, bargaining costs are also likely to be high, due
to the need to conduct due diligence and possibly comply with
extensive regulation under securities laws. Furthermore, evaluating
the worth of the token may be costly irrespective of the underlying
investment, as investors would need to examine the smart contract
and evaluate whether there are any loopholes in the code that hinder
the specific project’s distribution of revenues.233
As utility tokens are more intricate and can encompass different
sets of rights, it is difficult to provide a clear intuition regarding TC.
Currently, IEOs on crypto exchanges are generally limited to utility
tokens,234 implying that utility tokens are more liquid so that search
232

See Kloss, supra note 225, at 639; Nicholas J. Ajello, Fitting a Square Peg
in a Round Hole: Bitcoin, Money Laundering, and the Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 435, 438 (2015). For further
details on the technology, see Mathew Green & Ian Miers, Bolt: Anonymous
Payment Channels for Decentralized Currencies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017
ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
473, 476 (2017).
233
Note that these arguments are mostly applicable for private sales of tokens.
If tokenized securities are traded on public exchanges, e.g., due to a cooperation
between stock exchanges and blockchain companies, TC may decrease. As one
example for said cooperation, the Israeli Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) announced
that it will partner up with a blockchain lending platform (“BTP”). See Carrie Ramirez,
Israeli Exchange, BTP Team up on Blockchain Securities Platform, FIN. MAGNATES
(Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/israeliexchange-btp-team-up-on-blockchain-securities-platform/ [https://perma.cc/M54N24GB].
234
Albeit crypto exchanges can technically decide to sell security tokens, they
are then bound by the regulation related to such tokens. See SEC, INITIAL
EXCHANGE OFFERINGS (IEOS) – INVESTOR ALERT (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ia_initialexchangeofferings
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costs are sometimes low. In other instances, complex algorithms
behind a utility token can lead to both high search costs and high
bargaining costs,235 since the parties may find it challenging to pin
down the correct value of the token and determine the willingness
to pay and accept that value.
Table 1 below summarizes the expected relationship between
the type of token and TC.236

[https://perma.cc/F7MT-KFXB]. If the tokens are issued in compliance with the
regulation, the IEO becomes an STO. However, many exchanges purposefully
avoid that result by marketing only utility tokens and thus require token issuers to
supply a legal opinion that classifies the token as a utility token. See, e.g., Sergey
Baloyan, How To Launch Your IEO: Guide For Projects + List of Exchanges,
HACKERNOON (Apr. 6, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/how-to-launch-your-ieoguide-for-projects-list-of-exchanges-dcebca23bcac [https://perma.cc/TDZ2-9Z2U];
IEO (Initial Exchange Offering) Review: Pitfalls and Advantages, INMIND (Apr. 25,
2020), https://innmind.com/articles/1867 [https://perma.cc/V4EU-NVRP].
235
Evaluating the worth of a utility token is a difficult task, as the value may
depend on the exact functionality features as well as the number of people using
the token. See Lars Schlichting & Rossella Dressi Petrini, The Qualification of
Digital Assets according to Swiss Law, with Particular Reference to Stable Coins
4 (July 15, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3424571
[https://perma.cc/2EKL-P7CS]; Benedict J. Drasch et al., The Token’s Secret: The
Two-faced Financial Incentive of the Token Economy, 30 ELECTRONIC MKTS.
557, 557 (2020). See also Luz Parrondo & Andrei Boar, DLT-Based Token
Classification Towards Accounting Regulation 6 (UPF Barcelona Sch. of
Mgmt. Working Paper No. 6, 2020), https://www.bsm.upf.edu/sites/default/files/wo
rking_paper_6-_luz_parrondo_andrei_boar.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TP4-SUYR]
(arguing that the value of the utility tokens should be established by their
functionality and not be linked to speculation). For the user to assign an exact
value to the token, she must therefore understand not only the programmable
contingencies of the token but also how the value changes depending on the
manner of use by others. Furthermore, utility tokens that provide access to a
decentralized app depend on the features of that app—which are also created
using (potentially complex) code.
236
See supra Parts II.B (discussing the taxonomy of tokens) and IV.1
(discussing the distinction between different types of transaction costs).
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Table 1: TOKEN TAXONOMY AND TC
Search/Information costs

Bargaining/Decision costs

Currency tokens

Low

Low

Security tokens

High

High

Low/High

Low/High

Utility tokens

Note: This table summarizes the transaction costs that typically apply to each
category of tokens (Currency, Security, and Utility).

This rough division suggests that a liability rule should be
applied to security tokens (as TC are overall high), a property rule
should be applied to currency tokens (as TC are overall low), and a
case-by-case decision should be made for utility tokens (as TC are
ambiguous).
However, there seems to be at least one argument in favor of
always imposing a property rule for utility tokens as well: for such
tokens, it may be too costly to calculate damages, due to subjective
valuations. Furthermore, as each holder may gain a different utility
from the same token237—depending on how much an individual
benefits from the service to which the token relates—there is a fear
of imperfect compensation.
There are, however, several additional points to consider. First,
ordering a third party to transfer Bitcoins to a plaintiff can also
reside under a property tracing rule, rather than a property following
rule.238 For instance, suppose that Alice owns tokens that are
237

As a utility token’s value often hinges on the uses within a specific platform,
Louise Fjord Kjærsgaard & Autilia Arfwidsson, Taxation of Cryptocurrencies
from the Danish and Swedish Perspectives, 46 INTERTAX 620, 622 (2019), users
may differ in the value they get when using the platform, see also Lin William
Cong et al., Tokenomics: Dynamic Adoption and Valuation, 34 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1105, 1111 (2021) (developing a theoretical model wherein agents gain
heterogeneous benefits from using tokens).
238
See Fox, supra note 40, at 27–28. For an additional discussion of token
traceability see, e.g., Stephen M. McJohn & Ian McJohn, The Commercial Law
of Bitcoin and Blockchain Transactions 11–14 (Suffolk Univ. L. Sch. Research
Paper No. 16-13, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874463 [https://perma.cc/
P3DM-L534]. For a discussion of tracing in security laws, see Peter B. Oh,
Tracing, 80 TUL. L. REV. 849, 851–54 (2005).
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unwillingly transferred to Bob, e.g., due to hacking or extortion (by
Bob himself or by another person), and eventually traced to Bob’s
account. There are then two possible conceptual constructs that lead
to the conclusion that Alice is entitled to receive back the tokens:
The court can determine that Alice has the right of property
following, i.e., the Bitcoins are in fact her original property, or that
Alice has a right of property tracing, i.e., the located tokens are a
computerized conversion of Alice’s tokens into a new conceptual
token. The latter conclusion is in line with an argument raised by
Sarra and Gullifer, according to which Bitcoin does not truly “exist”
as an intangible item because only transactions are recorded on the
blockchain.239 Thus, conceptually a transfer of a token can be
thought of as eliminating an item in the sending account and creating
a new item in the receiving account. The implication of applying
property tracing (rather than following), is that the rule becomes a
quasi-liability rule: the plaintiff is entitled to receive other tokens,
which have the exact same value as the lost tokens, much like the
outcome of awarding damages.
Second, the analysis above focuses only on ex-post efficiency,
following the Coase Theorem. However, other theories in law and
economics—such as “incomplete contracts” theory240—focus
instead on ex-ante efficiency241 and on the fear of underinvestment
239

Sarra & Gullifer, supra note 155, at 271 (“[I]n one sense, Bitcoin does not
exist at all. What exists is a record of transactions that is held immutably on a
distributed ledger (a blockchain). The subject matter of those transactions has no
physical existence, not even as a line of code. Instead, it is a construct that, by
common consensus, has value in that people will exchange fiat currency, goods,
or services (things that are considered to have value in the ‘real world’) for it.”).
240
For details on incomplete contracts theory, see Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, ECONOMETRICA 756, 756 (1988);
Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to
Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 490 (1992); Jay P Kesan &
Marc Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D
Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 23, 29
(2000).
241
In the context of contracts, economists use the term ex-ante efficiency to
describe actions taken before the dispute arises, mostly focusing on investments
that the parties make as part of the contract. See, e.g., Robert E Scott & George
G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE
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in the property prior to negotiations.242 For instance, suppose that a
token holder can invest money to increase its value. If the holder
anticipates ex-post negotiations, he will only invest if he expects to
keep a sufficiently large share of the surplus that he creates by
investing; otherwise, there will be underinvestment.243 Hence,
incomplete contracts theory argues that bargaining power should be
given to the party who can invest.244
Applying this insight to the token’s taxonomy reveals an
interesting distinction. In security tokens, especially those issued
explicitly as a substitute for equity, buyers in an STO are
comparable to traditional financial market investors. Such investors
may well be able to increase the value of the issuing firm, just as
angel investors might invest precisely when they expect their
personal connections and abilities to provide additional value.245 The
same might also hold for utility tokens, when the underlying service
is such that external investments can increase their value,246 but does
W. RES. L. REV. 187, 189 (2005). For an application to intellectual property, see
Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 130 (2004).
242
Lemley, supra note 241, at 130.
243
See, e.g., Susanne Ohlendorf, Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts,
and Bilateral Investment, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1608, 1614 (2009).
244
See, e.g., William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures
for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39, 51 (1984); Hart & Moore, supra
note 240. Note that the theory also addresses the fear of over-investment, which
would occur if the token holder is fully insured because the remedy guarantees a
full refund. See, e.g., Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts
in a Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 725, 727 (2005)
(“contractual incompleteness also can lead to overinvestment”). See also Aaron
S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
33, 43–44 (2003) (“Contract law, however, awards the buyer the difference
between the buyer’s valuation given his investment and the price when the parties
do not trade; the buyer thus is fully insured against lost valuations regardless of
the investment level he chose. Therefore, the buyer will invest too much.”).
245
See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1411 (2008).
246
As the value of utility tokens may depend on how each user uses the token,
token holders who have a sufficiently large stake may be able to influence the
value of the token. See also supra text accompanying note 233. For instance, in
the popular platform Steemit.com, users can buy a “Steem Power” token that
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not seem to hold for currency tokens. Thus, from an ex-ante
perspective, the conclusion is again that property rules are better
applied for security tokens, and possibly for utility tokens.
A related aspect of ex-ante efficiency is discussed in an
influential paper by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.247 Among
other things, Kaplow and Shavell argue that property rules may be
superior even when TC are high, e.g., because a liability rule may
hinder the victim’s ex-ante incentive to mitigate harm248 (since the
victim’s anticipation of damages is a form of insurance that crowds
out the incentive to take precaution), or because the threat of
damages is ineffective if the injurer is judgment-proof (i.e., he who
cannot afford to pay and is thus undeterred by damages).249 Such
arguments may actually favor a one-size-fits-all property rule. On
the flip side, some arguments may favor a one-size-fits-all liability
rule. For instance, property rules have an inherent risk of being too
wide, as it is difficult to ensure that injunctions will only be enforced
to protect an infringed entitlement.250 As the courts should be able to
name a unique identifier for the token (e.g., the public address) in an
injunction, this concern seems weaker.251 However, none of the
grants more influence on the platform. STEEM, STEEM: AN INCENTIVIZED,
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED,
PUBLIC
CONTENT
PLATFORM
1
(2017),
https://steem.com/SteemWhitePaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6HU-HA8C]. A
large investment in such tokens can directly change the value of the platform and
hence the value of the tokens tied to that platform, such as the token “Steem.”
Such influence is usually not possible with currency tokens, as they are not tied a
specific platform. See id.
247
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:
An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718–20 (1996).
248
Id. at 721. Kaplow & Shavell also argue that liability rules may be superior
when TC are low. Id. at 734–35. However, their argument seems to be based on a
narrow definition of TC that excludes information costs (as they assume that low
TC can occur alongside asymmetric information). Id.
249
Id. at 721.
250
See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 784 (2006).
251
See id. at 785 (“[C]ourts cannot easily tailor injunctions to forbid only the
prohibited conduct. In these situations, injunctive relief can systematically
overcompensate plaintiffs and overdeter defendants, with significant negative
consequences for innovation and economic growth. Stated simply, where property
rules have pernicious consequences, liability rules look better by comparison.”).
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cases above mention any specific identifier, so that the fear of
over-arching injunctions is plausible.
An ex-ante perspective is also helpful in justifying why any
property rule should protect the rights of the original owner (Alice)
rather than others’ rights: Alice might only invest in enhancing the
value of her token if she can be sure that it will not be appropriated
later. Moreover, if the theft of tokens is permitted, such theft can
lead to wasted resources by both Alice, in an attempt to protect
herself against theft (e.g., paying for security software to protect
herself against hackers), and Bob, in an attempt to increase the
chance that the theft will be successful (e.g., by paying for hacking
tools).252
Third, frictions in the cryptocurrency market may cause TC to
always be high. For instance, search costs always apply to some extent,
as even on the Bitcoin blockchain, there is pseudo-anonymity: the
holder of the public key does not need to identify himself when
opening an “account.”253 The parties may then have to invest
resources in unmasking the identity behind a given wallet, e.g., by
hiring a private investigator. When these costs dominate, the
distinction ceases to be helpful, and theory would imply that only
liability rules should be adopted.
Fourth, smart contracts make it possible for market players to
choose between property rules and liability rules and implement
them automatically, using an appropriate algorithm.254 However, as
this choice of rules would require some form of negotiation to
establish the rules, high TC may make this approach infeasible
anyway.
Fifth, while most tokens are fungible, i.e., each token is equivalent
to all other tokens that bear the same title, some non-fungible tokens
(“NFTs”) have also emerged.255 For instance, some projects tie
252

See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies,
and Theft, 5 ECON. INQUIRY 224, 228–32 (1967) (discussing why theft is
inefficient).
253
See Rueckert, supra note 37, at 3.
254
See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE
L.J. 313, 376 (2017).
255
Michael Fröwis et al., Detecting Token Systems on Ethereum, in 11598
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY 93, 94 (2019).
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tokens to unique items256 (“tokenized items”), such as works of art
or items in a computer game. These tokens derive their value
precisely from their non-fungibility, as the uniqueness of the token
ensures that no one can create an equivalent item.257 NFTs intuitively
fall closer to utility tokens (albeit one can create a unique financial
instrument as well), but TC are amplified: tracking-down others who
are willing to buy and estimating their valuations seems even harder;
monetary compensation may be insufficient; and the incentive to
misappropriate the token is higher. Thus, NFTs provide a clear case
where a property rule should be enforced.258
Sixth, the discussion above revolves around a token owner and
does not consider derivative rights. Consider the following
hypothetical situation: Alice owns a utility token that grants access
to premium services in hotels, but unfortunately cannot take a
vacation in some year. Instead, she rents out her token to Bob. Bob
now controls the token but does not own it. A dispute arises between
Alice and Bob, where each claim that he or she now owns the token.

256
For instance, “VGO skins” tokens capture unique items that gamers can find
in computer games, such as “Counter Strike: Global Offensive.” See Brett
Abarbanel, & Joseph Macey, VGO, NFT, OMG! Commentary on Continued
Developments in Skins Wagering, 23 GAMING L. REV. 23, 23 (2019). Other
examples are ERC-721 tokens (which are registered on the Ethereum blockchain)
which are used, for instance, in the computer game “CryptoKitties” to reflect
collectable digital cats. See Thomas Ankenbrand et al., Proposal for a
Comprehensive (Crypto) Asset Taxonomy, IEEE 2020 CRYPTO VALLEY
CONFERENCE ON BLOCKCHAIN TECH. (CVCBT) 16, 23 (2020).
257
See, e.g., Mugdha Patil, Land Registry on Blockchain (May 14, 2020)
(Master’s Thesis, San José State University) (on file with SJSU ScholarWorks)
(“Games like CryptoCup, CryptoFighters and CryptoKitties [thirty] use ERC-721
as virtual collectibles. Their value is obtained from their scarcity, and NFT
application to the real world is an active research domain.”).
258
Note that currency tokens are always fungible, as they are intentionally
designed to be perfect substitutes for one another. However, this fungibility is also
applicable for many security and utility tokens. See Yuliya Guseva, A Conceptual
Framework for Digital-Asset Securities: Tokens and Coins as Debt and Equity,
80 MD. L. REV. 166, 174 (2020). For example, a token representing a share in a
company grants the same value as another token representing a share. Thus, the
issue of fungibility, by itself, does not seem to change the conclusion based on
Table 1.
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The hotels which take part in the service also join the case and object
to Bob’s use of the token.
For the dispute between Alice and Bob, imposing a liability rule
would seem strange because the TC of parties that have already
reached one agreement are unlikely to be very high.259 However, for
the dispute with third parties (the hotels), TC may increase rapidly.
Alice now must bargain with several parties, each with a different
interest, and it is unclear how Bob’s derivative right of using the
token should be evaluated. Furthermore, if Alice gives Bob her
private key, it is no longer clear who the owner is, unless one turns
to the written agreement and incurs litigation costs to prove what the
correct interpretation is (where the litigation costs constitute a form
of enforcement costs for the original agreement between Alice and
Bob). The analysis may become even more elaborate if, for instance,
Bob becomes insolvent,260 and multiple parties join the dispute
(creditors, crypto exchanges, companies providing online “wallets,”
etc.) and compete for a right in the token. It then depends on the
exact circumstances of the case, so that there may be no way out
other than resorting to a case-by-case analysis.
Seventh, whether third parties hold the token in good faith seems
important from both a legal and an economic perspective. From a
legal perspective, good faith constitutes a fairness argument for
granting innocent third parties rights in tokens, even if the seller was
not the lawful owner.261 In particular, although the list of transactions
may be transparent, it does not indicate what happened off-chain.
For instance, it is unclear whether crypto exchanges have any
feasible way of checking whether their clients obtain the token
lawfully. The economic reasoning is strong as well: imposing a
burden of ascertaining what happened off-chain translates into high
TC. Thus, protecting the rights of third parties who acquire a right

259
See supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting that that familiar parties
are one indicator of lower TC).
260
See Sarra & Gullifer, supra note 155 (discussing implications of
insolvency).
261
Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable
Balance between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of
Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 53 (1995).
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in good faith sits well with a law and economics approach.262 This
relationship implies that a property rule, favoring the rights gained
in a good-faith acquisition, should be adopted. A similar conclusion
can also be supported by the concept of the “least-cost avoider”:263
arguably, token owners possess superior information on the tokens
they own, enabling them to track them down when needed. Granting
a right to the opposite side—the third party—then incentivizes token
owners to take reasonable precautions (e.g., safeguard their private
key). Naturally, this logic does not extend to third parties who act in
bad faith, as such parties can also easily prevent the harm by refusing
to accept the tokens.
The difficult question is, however, how one should determine
whether a right was acquired in good faith. If regulators adopt the
proposal to establish blacklists,264 good faith would require the
receiver of the tokens to check such lists. This solution sounds easy
enough but may raise practical difficulties in cross-border
transactions, as some states might include a token on a blacklist that
others do not.
Eighth, as technology advances, cryptocurrency trade may take
on new forms that raise additional questions. For example,
blockchain technology has been criticized for lacking scalability,
due to the high computing power required to verify each transaction

262

See Arthur F. Salomons, Good Faith Acquisition of Movables, in TOWARDS
13 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., Kluwer L. Int’l 4th ed.
2009).
263
In the Law & Economics literature, scholars argue that, generally, liability
should be assigned to whichever person can avoid risks or harm at the lowest cost.
See Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Costavoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1992); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Nuno
Garoupa, Least Cost Avoidance, 25 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 235, 245 (2008); COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 25, at 343 (“Thus, the law assigns liability for harm suffered
by incompetent contractual partners to the competent people who can avoid the
harm at least cost. In this matter, the law follows the general principle of tort law,
according to which liability for accidents should fall on the party who can avoid
them at least cost.”).
264
Rueckert, supra note 37, at 3.
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in a decentralized way.265 As a partial solution, so-called “layer-two
protocols”266 has been developed, which allows parties to trade
off-chain in some way, then register the balance back on-chain. One
example is Bitcoin’s “lightning network,”267 which enables parties
to create “payment channels” between parties who trade
repeatedly.268 Then, instead of registering each and every transaction
between these parties on the blockchain, only the end-of-day
balance is registered.269 However, the registration of interim
transactions often goes through the same computers (same “nodes”),
leading to (technical) centralization.270 When disputes arise with
respect to registration during the bilateral off-chain trading, one may
argue that the object of the dispute is identical to traditional financial
disputes, as some centralized registration does exist. Similarly, as
some central banks take steps to enter the token market by issuing
their own digital currency,271 the role of the players becomes blurry.

265

See Jordi Herrera-Joancomartí & Cristina Pérez-Solà. Privacy in Bitcoin
Transactions: New Challenges from Blockchain Scalability Solutions, in 9880
MODELING DECISIONS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 26, 31 (Vicenç Torra et al.
eds., 2016).
266
See generally Lewis Gudgeon et al., Sok: Layer-two Blockchain Protocols,
in 12059 FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY 174, 218 (Joseph
Bonneau & Nadia Heninger eds. 2020) (explaining that “layer-two protocols rely
on challenge-response protocols to detect and prove misbehavior using the
blockchain as a recourse for disputes”).
267
Jian-Hing Lin et al., Lightning Network: A Second Path Towards
Centralisation of the Bitcoin Economy, 22 NEW J. OF PHYSICS 1, 1 (2020).
268
Id.
269
See, e.g., Craig Wright, Why Lightning Will Never be Currency, and Why
BSV Matters, MEDIUM (Mar. 15, 2019), https://medium.com/@craig_10243/whylightning-will-never-be-currency-and-why-bsv-matters-60dfa5c9ac4d
[https://perma.cc/96XJ-DKUP] (stating that “[t]he concept is simple; the parties
to the transaction maintain an offline ledger that is settled periodically. The
difficulty comes as there is no recording of the intermediary states. When there
are many routes and many hops, the parties to a transaction on either end do not
see the intermediary exchanges, only the balance. When it finally settles on chain,
all of the intermediate steps are lost.”).
270
Id.
271
Xuan Han et al., A Blockchain-Based Framework for Central Bank Digital
Currency, in 2019 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON SERV. OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS, AND
INFORMATICS (SOLI) 263, 263 (2019).
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Ninth, the examples given above relate to infringements that
completely prevent a token holder from utilizing her token (e.g.,
because the token was transferred), whereas the Coase Theorem and
the arguments of Calabresi and Melamed are mostly motivated by
the scenario of a nuisance.272 From a theoretical standpoint, it does
not seem to matter whether the damage to the token holder amounts
to a full or partial interruption, but nuisances may, of course, also
occur with cryptocurrencies. For example, Bob may use Alice’s
internet bandwidth, thereby slowing down her trade, interfere with
the service to which Alice’s utility tokens grant access, or disrupt
the computer protocol in other ways.273 The arguments made above
equally apply to these scenarios, i.e., whether a property or liability
rule should be adopted will depend on TC.
Finally, the analysis above focuses on TC but considers neither
distribution effects nor justice arguments, which can outweigh
efficiency concerns in some contexts. For instance, suppose that, in
the future, pension funds will hold a large share of tokens. When
such tokens are stolen, a loss to the pension fund has quite different
consequences than a loss to an individual, as the retired workers’
population will suffer the consequences.274 Similarly, even if the
pension fund can prevent the harm more easily than a third party, it
seems unfair to punish the workers for the carelessness of the
272

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1105–06, consider nuisance law as
an example where the law often assigns a liability rule, as the person causing a
nuisance can continue doing so conditional on paying compensation nuisance.
Then, if there are high transaction costs, e.g., because the nuisance infringes on
the rights of multiple victims at the same time, an efficient allocation is not
necessarily achieved (as the Coase Theorem implies that low transaction costs are
needed for an efficient allocation).
273
For a discussion of liability when a blockchain protocol fails, see Peder Østbye,
Who is Liable if a Cryptocurrency Protocol Fails? 1 (July 21, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3423681 [https://
perma.cc/DCB5-R35S].
274
Workers save money for pension in anticipation of redeeming their savings
when they retire. However, pension funds typically invest the saving in
investments, reflecting different degrees of risk, depending on where the money
is invested. If a pension fund invests the money in cryptocurrencies but does not
take ample precaution to protect the private key (e.g., due to a principal-agent
problem, where the pension fund managers do not sufficiently care about the
savers) a theft of token reflects a direct loss to the savers.
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pension fund. In other words, the optimal choice of rules should
consider all the relevant considerations, including, but not limited
to, transaction costs.
V. CONCLUSION
Cryptotokens and blockchain technology are transforming
various markets and offer a disruptive technology, which bears clear
advantages275 but is not yet fully understood. As the technology
matures and its adoption spreads, more and more conflicts
surrounding cryptotokens are naturally expected to arise. Both the
academic literature276 and several court cases277 have already
identified the conceptual difficulties of classifying tokens, mostly
because of their decentralized registration method. However, as
disputes should not be resolved arbitrarily, the law should evolve
and find suitable principles and rules that can be reasonably applied
to cryptotokens.
The existing court rulings around the world provide mixed
policies, some of which adopt a property rule278 while others adopt
a liability rule.279 However, the courts seem to neglect the
implications of adopting a one-size-fits-all rule (of either kind), and
do not dedicate sufficient attention to the fact that tokens are not
homogenous.
This Article proposed to examine the question of how one
should protect entitlements in cryptotokens under the prism of law
and economics. This approach greatly simplifies the conceptual
problem, as tokens are easily classifiable as property, but highlights
275

Cryptotokens bear advantages such as a decentralized transaction
registration (eliminating the need for intermediaries), immutable registration
(preventing the risk of data manipulation), and a global market that does not
depend on local constraints. See Jabotinsky & Sarel, supra note 65, at 19.
276
Fox, supra note 40, at 3–4; Ng, supra note 40, at 327.
277
See AA v. Persons Unknown & Ors, Re Bitcoin [2019] EWHC (Comm)
3556 § 58 (U.K). See also Babie, supra note 20, at 1 (reviewing the discussion in
Ruscoe & Moore v. Cryptopia Limited (In Liquidation) [2020] NZHC 728).
278
See, e.g., AA v. Persons Unknown & Ors, Re Bitcoin [2019] EWHC
(Comm) 3556 § 63; Ruscoe and Moore v. Cryptopia Limited (In Liquidation)
[2020] NZHC 728 at [120].
279
See, e.g., B2C2 Limited v. Quoine PTC Ltd., [2019] SGHC (I) 03 [144, 149]
(Sing.).
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the need to examine the types of transaction costs that arise in the
trade of cryptotokens. This Article’s suggestion of using the usual
taxonomy of tokens as a benchmark for transaction costs is in line
with the argument that “differently designed cryptocurrencies need
to be regulated differently depending on their technological
characteristics.”280
Focusing on the token’s category can then assist in determining
whether search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs,
and enforcement costs are likely to be high—in which case
economic theory suggests liability rules—or low—in which case
property rules are recommended. Dealing with the heterogeneous
nature of tokens may be a difficult task and some case-by-case
distinctions may be inevitable. One option might be to take a
three-step approach: classify the token as belonging to a certain
category, apply the rule that typically fits the category as a default,
and examine whether it makes sense considering case-specific
transaction costs. Such an approach would appear to strike a fair
balance between selecting a “one-size-fits-all” solution and
individual solutions for each token.281 However, selecting the exact
approach goes beyond the scope of this Article. Indeed, this Article
does not intend to provide a detailed prescription, but rather to
highlight the problem and the relevance of the law and economics
framework for its possible solution.

280

Rueckert, supra note 37, at 4.
Note that the discussion of how much one should rely on pre-existing
categories mirrors the dilemma that courts face when deciding whether to adhere
to the legal precedent and when to invest effort into making a more ad-hoc rule
that is better-suited for the case at hand. From a law and economics perspective,
following the categories is preferable if the “information costs” incurred by
searching for the best rule are large compared to the transaction costs of the parties
whose rights the court wished to (re)allocate. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note
25, at 94.
281

